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THE  ELEVENTH  AMENDMENT  AND  OTHER
SOVEREIGN  IMMUNITY  DOCTRINES:
PART ONE
MARTHA  A.  FIELDt
This article is the first of a series collectively entitled
The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity
Doctrines.  The present article introduces the issues to be
addressed by  the  series, and suggests  that sovereign  im-
munity is a common  law doctrine, and is not constitution-
ally compelled.  The second article will address congres-
sional power to override state immunity.  The third article
will discuss questions respecting the relief available from
state defendants.
I. AN OvERvimw
The  one  interpretation  of  the  eleventh  amendment  to  which
everyone  subscribes is  that it  was intended to overturn  Chisholm v.
Georgia. 1  Chisholm was  a  case  in  the  Supreme  Court's  original
jurisdiction  in  which  South  Carolina  citizens  sued  the  State  of
Georgia  to  recover  on  confiscated  bonds.  Rejecting  the  objection
that it  lacked jurisdiction  over private  individuals'  suits  against  a
state,  the Court entered a default judgment  against Georgia,  which
had declined  to  appear.
There  is  no  agreement  whether  Chisholm  was  "right"  or
"wrong"  in the sense  of according  with the intent  of the Constitu-
tion's Framers.  The conventional  view 2 is that the Supreme Court
departed  from the Framers'  intent that states be immune  from pri-
vate suits,  and  that the  eleventh  amendment  restored  the  original
understanding.  Recent studies have eroded that theory, however, by
pointing  out  statements  contemporary  with  the  adoption  of  the
f Professor  of Law,  University  of  Pennsylvania.  A.B.  1965,  Radcliffe  College;
J.D.  1968,  University  of Chicago.  Member,  District  of Columbia  Bar.
This  Article  was  written  pursuant  to  a  fellowship  from  the  Research  Institute
on Legal  Assistance.  @ Copyright  1977 by National Legal  Services  Corporation.
12 U.S.  (2  Dall.)  419  (1793).
2 E.g.,  Monaco  v. Mississippi,  292  U.S.  313,  325  (1934);  Hans  v. Louisiana,
134  U.S.  1,  12  (1890);  M.  IRISH  & J.  PROHaO,  TnE Porrrxcs  OF  AMEUcAN
DmNocuAcy  117  (3d  ed.  1965);  C.  LEEDHam,  OUu  CHANGING  CoNSIUMoN  51
(1964);  1  C.  WARRr,  THE  StrPmME COURT  Ir  UNrED  STATES  HISTORY  91, 96
(1922);  Cullison,  Interpretation  of the Eleventh Amendment  (A  Case of the White
Knightes Green Whiskers), 5  Hovs. L. Buv.  1, 7, 9  (1967).
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Constitution indicating  that states might be  subject  to suit by pri-
vate  individuals.8
There  is  also  little  agreement  about  many  issues  concerning
the scope of state sovereign  immunity.  A few examples:  Where, in
the Constitution, does sovereign immunity come from?  What forms
of relief can litigants  obtain from  the state?  How  is it determined
whether  a suit is against  the  state or against an  official as  an indi-
vidual?  Can Congress,  legislating  under  article  I, lift a  state's im-
munity from suit in federal court without the state's  consent?  Can
Congress,  legislating under article I, remove a state's immunity from
suit in state court, without the state's  consent?
One might  expect  that a  look at the  language  of the  eleventh
amendment  would  help  resolve  most  sovereign  immunity  issues.
The  problem  is  that the  eleventh  amendment  is  universally  taken
not to  mean what it  says.  It  states:  "[t]he  Judicial  power  of  the
United States shall not be construed to  extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced  or prosecuted  against  one of  the United  States
by Citizens of another  State, or by Citizens or  Subjects  of any For-
eign State."  While this language quite clearly  includes only actions
brought  "by  Citizens  of another  State"  or foreign  citizens  or  sub-
jects  (noncitizen  suits),  the amendment  has long been held to pro-
tect states from  suits by its own  citizens  (citizen suits)  4by federal
corporations,"  and  by  foreign  states.6  Moreover,  the  amendment,
contrary to its language, has been held to apply to suits in admiralty
as well  as  to  those in  law  and equity.7  And  although  the amend-
ment  denies  to  the  federal  courts  "the  judicial power"  to hear  the
described cases,  it has consistently been accepted that the forbidden
cases  could  be  brought  in federal  court  upon  the  state's  consent.8
3 E.g.,  C.  JAcoBs,  Tim  ELEVENh  A  Nmn  .Dn  Nr  AND  SOVEREIGN  MNniT
(1972);  Nowal,  The  Scope  of  Congressional Power  to  Create Causes  of  Action
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth  Amend-
ments, 75  COLUm.  L.  Rv. 1413  (1975).  The  first  Justice  Harlan  also  believed,  as
early  as  1890,  that  Chisholm "was  based  upon  a sound  interpretation  of  the  Con-
stitution  as  that instrument  then was."  Hans  v. Louisiana,  134  U.S.  1,  21  (1890)
(concurring  opinion).  The  Court's  opinion  in  New  Hampshire  v. Louisiana,  180
U.S.  76,  91  (1883),  seemingly  also  supports  the  correctness  of Chisholm.
4The  leading  case  is  Hans  v.  Louisiana,  134  U.S.  1  (1890).  See  Duhne  v.
New  Jersey,  251  U.S.  311,  313  (1920);  Fitts  v.  McGhee,  172  U.S.  516,  524-25
(1899);  North  Carolina v. Temple,  134 U.S. 22  (1890).
5 Smith v. Reeves,  178  U.S.  436, 445-49  (1900).
6Monaco  v. Mississippi,  292  U.S.  313  (1934).
7 Ex parte New  York,  256  U.S. 490,  497-500  (1921).
SClark  v.  Barnard,  108  U.S.  436,  447  (1883),  is  the  "leading  case"  on  this
issue  although  the  state  in  that  case,  as  a  voluntary  intervenor  to  obtain  money
that  had been  paid  into the  court,  may  have  been  more  in  the  role  of  a  plaintiff
than a  defendant.  But the  rule  that jurisdiction  attaches  upon  consent  to  suit  has
been  followed  when  the  state  was  clearly  in  the posture  of  defendant.  Parden  v.
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Actually,  there  is  some  dispute  whether  the  "extensions"  of
the  eleventh  amendment-most  notably  the  extension  to  suits by a
state's own  citizens-are  compelled by  that amendment  itself  or in-
stead  have  another  source.  What  that  source  might  be  is  also  a
question  of  dispute,  the  implications  of  which  we  will  explore
herein.  It  has long been held, at any rate, that the doctrine limiting
suits  by a  state's  own  citizens  is  of  constitutional  dimension.9  It
may  not be  of great  consequence  whether  this  constitutional  rule
follows  from  the  eleventh  amendment  or  instead  from  another
source, as becomes apparent when one reflects upon the similarity of
doctrines of the federal government's immunity.  Federal immunity
clearly  does not derive  from  the eleventh  amendment,  although  it
has no  other apparent  constitutional  source.10  Yet in substance  it
has  developed  as  an almost  exact  counterpart  of  eleventh  amend-
ment-state  sovereign  immunity  doctrines. 1  (In  fact,  the  theory
behind the doctrines  of state and federal  sovereign immunity is suf-
ficiently  similar  that  the  reasoning  of  cases  discussing  federal  sov-
ereign immunity almost always carries  over  to eleventh amendment
Terminal  By.,  377  U.S.  184  (1964);  Petty  v. Tennessee-Missouri  Bridge  Comm'n,
359 U.S. 275  (1959).  Accord, Kennecott  Copper  Corp.  v.  State Tax Comm'n,  327
U.S.  573,  577  (1946)  (rule  stated  but  no  consent  found);  Ford  Motor  Co.  v.
Dep't  of Treasury,  323  U.S.  459,  464-65  (1945);  Missouri  v.  Fiske,  290  U.S.  18,
24  (1933);  Hans  v.  Louisiana,  134  U.S.  1,  17  (1890).  Cf.  United  States  v.
Louisiana,  123  U.S.  32  (1887)  (upon  United  States'  consent to  suit,  action  against
it falls within "the judicial  power").
Recently,  Justice Brennan has raised  objections  to this view,  and he  claims  that
whether  federal  courts  have  jurisdiction  over  noncitizen  suits,  upon  the  state's
consent, should be deemed an  open question.  Employees  of Dep't of Public  Health
and Welfare v. Department  of Public Health  and  Welfare,  411  U.S.  279,  298,  310,
321-22  (1973)  (Government  Employees)  (dissenting  opinion).  For  a  possible
solution to  the consent  dilemma, see  text  accompanying  notes  95-97 infra.
In  other  respects,  however,  the  concept  of  sovereign  immunity  as  a  jurisdic-
tional  limitation  has  been  preserved;  for  example,  the  sovereign  innunity  defense
is not  lost by a failure  to raise  it in the  lower federal  courts  at  trial.  Edelman  v.
Jordan,  415  U.S.  651,  677-78  (1974).  But  see  Vecchione  v.  Wohlgemuth,  558
F.2d  150  (3d  Cir.  1977),  cert.  denied, 46  U.S.L.W.  3303  (U.S.  Nov.  8,  1977)
(No.  77-382).
9 Employees  of  Dep't  of  Public  Health  and  Welfare  v. Department  of  Public
Health  and  Welfare,  411  U.S.  279,  285  (1973);  Ford  Motor  Co.  v.  Dep't  of
Treasury,  323  U.S.  459,  464  (1945);  Ex parte Young,  209  U.S.  123,  150  (1908);
Chandler  v. Dix,  194 U.S.  590,  591  (1904).  Nevertheless,  the  first  case  sustaining
a state's  claim  of  immunity from  federal  suits  brought by  citizens  did  not  ground
that  immunity  in  the  Constitution.  See  notes  80-81  infra & accompanying  text
(discussing  Hans  v. Louisiana,  134  U.S.  1  (1890)).
10 The doctrine  may  not even  be  constitutionally  required.  See  United  States
v.  Lee,  106  U.S.  196,  205-07  (1882);  Cohens  v.  Virginia,  19  U.S.  (6  Wheat.)
264,  411-12  (1821).
11 For the principal  difference,  see note  24 infra.
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cases  (and other  state  sovereign  immunity  cases)  and vice  versa.
12
Accordingly,  quite  a  few  cases  dealing  with  the  immunity  of  the
federal government are prominent  in this Article, despite  Congress'
recent abrogation  of the sovereign immunity of the United States;  13
they  are  useful  in piecing  together  the  Court's  general  theory  of
sovereign  immunity,  which  today  is  limited  primarily  to  suits
against state governments  and state officials.)  Whether  all suits rec-
ognizing state  sovereign  immunity are deemed within  the eleventh
amendment's  protection  or not will  be of little consequence  as long
as the sovereign immunity protection outside of the eleventh amend-
ment continues to be so  remarkably  like the protection  the amend-
ment affords.
While  the  foregoing  judicial  interpretations  of  the  reach  of
sovereign  immunity are difficult to justify in terms  of clearcut con-
stitutional  language,  at least  it  is,  and  has  long  been,  clear what
those rules are.14  Other sovereign immunity issues have been much
more  difficult  to resolve.  One might imagine  it to  be  self-evident,
given  the  foregoing,  that when  a private  individual,  for  example,
brings  a suit against a  state, sovereign immunity applies.  But how
is  one  to  tell  whether  the  suit  is  against  the  state?  Simply  by
whether  the state  is  named  as  the  defendant?  Chief Justice  Mar-
shall announced that rule in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,15
12 See  Cunningham  v.  Macon  &  B.R.R.,  109  U.S.  446,  451  (1883);  United
States  v. Lee,  106  U.S.  196,  206-07  (1882).  See  also  Monaco  v. Mississippi,  292
U.S.  313  (1934);  Ex parte  New  York,  256  U.S.  490,  497  (1921).  Perhaps  the
reason for  the similarity of rules  is that  the dispositive  question, for both states'  and
United  States'  immunity,  is  conceptualized  as  whether  the  suit  is  against  the  gov-
ernment;  the  complex  of sovereign  immunity  rules,  for both  states  and  the  United
States,  is a way  of  arriving  at an  answer to  this  question.
13 Pub.  L.  No.  94-574,  § 1,  90  Stat.  2721  (amending  5  U.S.C.  §§  702,  703
(1976)).  That  enactment  provides  principally  that  "[a]n  action  in  a  court  of  the
United States  seeking  relief other  than money  damages  and stating  a  claim  that  an
agency or an officer  or employee  thereof acted or failed to act in  an official  capacity
or  under  color  of  legal  authority  shall  not  be  dismissed  nor relief  therein  denied
on  the  ground  that  it  is  against  the  United States  or  that  the  United  States  is  an
indispensable party.  The United  States  may  be named  as  a  defendant in  any  such
action,  and  a judgment  or  decree  may  be entered  against  the  United  States  ...  ."
Damage  claims  against  the  United  States  can be prosecuted  under the  Tucker
Act,  28  U.S.C.  §§  1346,  1491  (1970),  and the  Federal  Tort  Claims  Act,  28  U.S.C.
§ 1346(b)  (1970).  Those provisions  are not  affected  by the recent  enactment.
14 There  are,  of  course,  dissents.  See,  for  example,  Justice  Brennan's  opinion
in  Government  Employees  adopting  positions  quite  different  from  the  majority's
views  on  suits  between  a  state  and  its  own  citizens,  and  on  the  effect  of  state
consent  to  suit.  411  U.S.  at  298.  See  also  Edelman  v.  Jordan,  415  U.S.  651,
687-88  (1974)  (Brennan,  J.,  dissenting).
1522 U.S.  (9  Wheat.)  738,  846,  857  (1824).  Osborn  was  the  auditor  of  the
State  of  Ohio.  The  Court  did  not  treat  the  case  as  one  brought  by  the  United
States;  rather, it treated the  Bank  as  a  private  plaintiff.  (Similarly,  the  Court  held
during  this  period  that  state  government  corporations  do  not  partake  of the  state's
immunity.  Briscoe  v. Bank  of  Kentucky,  36  U.S.  (11  Pet.)  257  (1837);  Bank  of
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but it was not followed as early as Governor of Georgia  v. Madrazo,1
the  Court,  again speaking  through  Chief  Justice  Marshall,  saying
that "where  the chief magistrate  of a state  is sued, not by his name,
but by his style  of office,  and  the claim made upon him is  entirely
in his official  character, we  think the state itself  may be considered
as a party  on  the  record."  '17  One could,  I suppose,  have  the rule
that a suit is against the state whenever the state is named as defend-
ant or whenever  the  defendant  is  a public  official  acting in  his  or
her  official  capacity.  (The litigation  then  would concern  the  cor-
rect line between acting in an official and a private capacity.)  This
country departed  from  that rule at least  as early as  1882  when the
Court held in United States v. Lee 18  that suits to recover  one's own
property  from the government are not suits against  the sovereign.19
Ex parte Young 20 placed another limitation upon the principle  that
a suit is against the state whenever the state or a public official,  act-
ing  in  his  or her  official  capacity,  is  the  named  defendant.  The
Court  there  held  that suits  to  enjoin  unconstitutional  state  action
may  be  maintained  against  public  officials.
There is therefore an opening for maintaining suit against  the
state, available  even  to  the  parties  explicitly  denied  the  ability  to
sue  by  the  Constitution.  Those  parties  are  not able  to  sue  when
the state  is named as defendant, but they are  sometimes allowed to
sue when a public official is named instead.2 1  In 1949, in Larson v.
Kentucky  v.  Wister,  27  U.S.  (2  Pet.)  318  (1829);  Bank  of  United  States  v.
Planters' Bank,  22  U.S.  (9 Wheat.)  904 (1824).)
1626  U.S.  (1  Pet.)  110  (1828).  The plaintiff  in that  case  sought  to  recover
slaves,  currently  in the  state  government's  possession.  The  slaves  had been  seized
from  him  under  the  authority  of the  governor,  on  the  ground  that  they had  been
illegally  brought  into  the  state.  The  plaintiff  also  sought  money  from  the  state
treasury  representing  the  proceeds  from  those  of the  slaves  who  had  already  been
resold.
1726  U.S.  (1  Pet.)  at  123.  In  fact  the  Osborn  rule  was  not  definitively
repudiated  until much later, in In re Ayers,  123  U.S.  443  (1887)  and  Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy,  140  U.S.  1  (1891).  In  the  interim,  other  cases  adhered  to  the
Osborn rule.  Board  of  Liquidation  v.  McComb,  92  U.S.  531  (1876);  Davis  v.
Gray, 83  U.S.  (16  Wall.)  203  (1872).
18  106 U.S.  196  (1882).  See note  12  supra & accompanying  text.
1 9 Osborn  v. Bank of  the United  States, 22  U.S.  (9  Wheat.)  738  (1824),  may
be  deemed to have established  the rule much  earlier.  See also  Meigs  v.  M'Clung's
Lessee,  13  U.S.  (9  Cranch)  11  (1815);  United States  v. Peters,  9  U.S.  (9  Craneh)
115  (1809).
For a later limitation on the  rule that  one  can  recover  one's  own  property,  see
note  26  infra & accompanying  text.
20209  U.S.  123  (1908).  For  earlier  cases  foreshadowing  the  rule,  see,  e.g.,
Smyth v. Ames,  169  U.S. 466  (1898);  Allen  v. Baltimore  & O.R.R.,  114  U.S.  311
(1885);  Davis v. Gray, 83  U.S.  (16  Wall.)  203  (1872).
21 The  case  name,  United States  v.  Lee,  suggests  the  suit  was  against  the
government  itself  rather than  its  officers.  In fact,  the  circuit  court  had  dismissed
the  suit against  the  United  States,  at  the  request  of the  plaintiffs,  and  against  all
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Domestic & Foreign Commerce  Corp., 22  the  Court  described  this
opening and attempted  to delineate  the suits against public  officers
that would be allowed.  It  said that in damage actions  the question
was  easy:  the  suit is  against  the named  state  official.  In suits  for
specific relief the question is more difficult, according to the Court.
2 3
The answer it provided is that officials  may be sued for unconstitu-
tional action or action contrary to statute 24 but not for actions  that
are "merely  illegal"  in  the sense  of being  tortious  or in breach  of
other  defendants  except  Frederick  Kaufman  and Richard  P. Strong,  in whose  names
the  Attorney  General  of  the  United  States  was  acting.  Judgment  was  rendered
against  those individuals  in the  circuit  court,  ejecting  them  from the  disputed  land,
a judgment  that the Supreme  Court  affirmed.  106  U.S.  196  (1882).
22337 U.S.  682  (1949).
23 The  Court's  language  setting  out this  structure for  analyzing  relief problems
bears reading:
The  crucial  question  is  whether  the  relief  sought in  a  suit nominally  ad-
dressed  to  the  officer  is relief  against  the sovereign.  In a suit  against  the
officer  to recover  damages  for the  agent's  personal  actions,  that  question  is
easily  answered.  The  judgment  sought  will  not  require  action  by  the
sovereign  or  disturb  the  sovereign's  property.  There  is,  therefore,  no
jurisdictional  difficulty.  The  question  becomes  difficult  and  the  area  of
controversy  is  entered when the suit is  not one for damages  but for specific
relief:  i.e.,  the  recovery  of  specific  property  or  monies,  ejectment  from
land,  or  injunction  either  directing  or  restraining  the  defendant  officer's
actions.  ...  [Tihis  question  ....  arises  whenever  suit is  brought  against
an  officer  of  the  sovereign  in  which  the  relief  sought  from  him  is  not
compensation  for  an  alleged  wrong  but,  rather,  the  prevention  or  discon-
tinuance, in rem, of  the wrong.
Id.  687-88  (footnotes  omitted).
24 Larson's rule  of  official  accountability  for statutory  (as  distinct  from  consti-
tutional)  violations  does  not,  however,  of  its  own  force,  apply  to  actions  against
state officials.  Although  in most respects the states'  and the  United States'  sovereign
immunity  doctrines  are counterparts,  see text  accompanying  notes  12-13  supra, the
rules  on  official  accountability  for  statutory  violations  may  differ,  because  federal
law will  not  impose  the  rules  of  accountability  when  the  cause  of  action  is  state-
created.  Federal  officials  are accountable,  then, for unconstitutional  action  or action
contrary  to  statute,  but state  officers'  defenses  of sovereign  immunity  will  fail,  as  a
matter  of  federal  law,  only  in  suits  with  a  federal  constitutional  basis  (including,
through  the  Supremacy  Clause,  suits  alleging  breach  of federal  legislation).  State
law  doctrines  of sovereign  immunity  will  be  followed  when  the  basis  of  a  lawsuit
is  a violation  of state  law-whether  statutory  or common  law.  Gerr  v. Emrick,  283
F.2d  293  (3d  Cir.  1960);  Zeidner  v.  Wulforst,  197  F.  Supp.  23,  25  (E.D.N.Y.
1961).  See  also  Broward  County  v.  Wickman,  195  F.2d  614  (5th  Cir.  1952).
Whether  a  suit against a state  officer  alleging  breach of a state  statute  is considered
actionable  or is instead  deemed  a suit  against  the sovereign is  therefore  a matter  of
state  law.
Prior  to  Erie  R.R.  v.  Tompkins,  304  U.S.  62  (1938),  however,  state  officials
acting  outside  their  statutory  authority,  and  even  officials  acting  tortiously  or  in
negligent  disregard  of state  laws,  were deemed  to  be acting  as  individuals  and  were
personally  liable.  Martin  v. Lankford,  245  U.S.  547  (1918);  Johnson  v.  Lankford,
245  U.S.  541  (1918);  Louisville  & N.R.R.  v. Greene,  244 U.S.  522  (1917);  Greene
v. Louisville  & Interurban  R.R.,  244  U.S.  499  (1917);  Atchison,  T. & S.F.  Ry.  v.
O'Connor,  223  U.S.  280  (1912);  Scully  v.  Bird,  209  U.S.  481  (1908);  Tindal  v.
Wesley,  167  U.S.  204  (1897);  South  Carolina  v.  Wesley,  155  U.S.  542  (1895);
Pennoyer  v. McConnaughy,  140  U.S.  1  (1891).
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contract.25  This  exclusion  of  tort  and  contract  suits  is  the  prin-
cipal  holding  of  Larson. 2 6  In  a  footnote,  however,  the  Larson
Court added that even  a suit based upon unconstitutional  conduct
or  conduct  contrary  to  statute  may  be  precluded  "if the  relief re-
quested cannot be  granted by merely  ordering the cessation  of the
conduct  complained  of but will require  affirmative  action  by  the
sovereign  or  the  disposition  of  unquestionably  sovereign  prop-
erty."  27  The effect of this footnote was not wholly evident.  Suits
requiring  affirmative  action  by the sovereign  had been entertained
previously,2 8  and they were  not mentioned in Larson.
Larson's framework  for approaching sovereign immunity  issues
remains  useful  today.  Its  differentiation,  for  sovereign  immunity
purposes,  between  damage  actions  and  those for  specific  relief  has
antecedents  dating back to  the nineteenth century,  and the distinc-
tion persists as an important element in current sovereign immunity
law.  The problem area of affirmative  action that Larson pinpointed
is  still  a  problem area  today;  the  state  of  the law  on  that  subject
remains  ill-defined.  The  major  issue  in  suits  for  specific  relief
against  public  officials  remains,  however,  this  question  of  which
forms  of relief are permissible.
There  have  been  changes  since  Larson, however.  First,  the
problem  in damage actions  has not proved as  simple as  the Larson
Court  supposed.  Moreover,  the  recent  abrogation  of  the  United
States'  immunity29  has  rendered  largely  irrelevant  the  distinction
that Larson advanced  between  suits  for merely  illegal actions  and
those alleging unconstitutionality  or a statutory violation.3 0  Finally,
new  ways  of  avoiding  the  impact  of  the  sovereign  immunity doc-
trines  have  emerged  since  Larson.  The  two  most notable  are  the
doctrine  of  constructive  waiver  of  sovereign  immunity  and  con-
gressional imposition of remedies against the states.
2 5 Suits  against public officials  can  also be maintained,  obviously,  if the  officials
acted  in a purely personal  capacity.  The  Court  used  as  an  example  a suit  against
a public  official  concerning  a  contract  for the  sale  of his  personal  home.  337  U.S.
at  689.
26 This  ruling  was  new to  Larson, despite  that  Court's  laboring to  ground  it in
precedent;  the holding  in United  States  v. Lee,  106  U.S.  196  (1882),  that  one  can
recover  one's  property wrongfully  held by  the state  retains  its vitality only  for  suits
based  on  constitutional  or  statutory  violations.
27 337  U.S. at 691  n.11  (citation  omitted).
28 E.g.,  mandamus  actions.  See  Wilbur v. United  States  ex  rel. Krushnic,  280
U.S.  306  (1930);  Houston v. Ormes,  252  U.S.  469  (1920);  Lane v.  Hoglund,  244
U.S.  174  (1917);  Roberts  v. United  States,  176  U.S.  221  (1900).  See  generally
Work v. United  States ex rel. lives, 267 U.S.  175,  177-78,  184  (1925).
29 See note  13 supra.
30 That  distinction  already  did  not  affect  state sovereign  immunity  suits.  See
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II.  SOME  UNDERLYING  ISSUES  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  INTERPRETATION
There are several  live disputes concerning eleventh amendment
interpretation that seem largely theoretical  yet have  potential  prac-
tical  significance.  In  some  instances,  they  also  provide  some  ra-
tionale  for  the  enormous  difference  between  the  actual  scope  of
sovereign immunity and  the  language  of the eleventh  amendment.
A.  The Sources of Sovereign Immunity
1. Some Possibilities
The  principal  issue  is  what  source,  other  than  the  eleventh
amendment,  gives  rise  to  sovereign  immunity.  Some  statements
seem  to  adopt  the somewhat  bold position  that  all  state  sovereign
immunity  derives  from  the  eleventh  amendment,3'  despite  the
amendment's  wording indicating its applicability only to suits "com-
menced or prosecuted  against one  of the  United  States  by Citizens
of another  State".  The apparent  rationale  is that whatever reason-
ing requires  immunity for noncitizen  suits  applies equally  to  suits
by a state's  own citizens.32  Moreover,  the  Court has reasoned,  the
eleventh amendment would not have been adopted had it contained
a proviso allowing suit by a state's  own  citizens.33  Reasoning  thus,
opinions  occasionally  state  bluntly  that  the  only  proper  way  to
effectuate  the eleventh amendment  is  to disregard its  express word-
ing.34  This  position  that  the eleventh  amendment  alone  supports
31 E.g.,  Edelman  v.  Jordan,  415  U.S.  651,  663  (1974)  ("the  Hans  line  of
cases  permitted  the State  to  raise  the Eleventh  Amendment  as  a  defense to  suit by
its  own  citizens");  United  States  v.  Mississippi,  380  U.S.  128,  140  (1965);  Ford
Motor  Co. v.  Dep't of  Treasury,  323  U.S.  459,  464  (1945);  Ex parte  Young,  209
U.S.  123,  150  (1908);  McAuliffe  v.  Carlson,  520  F.2d  1305,  1307  n.4  (2d  Cir.
1975),  cert. denied, 427  U.S.  911  (1976);  Mobil  Oil  Corp.  v.  Kelley,  493  F.2d
784,  786  (5th  Cir.),  cert.  denied, 419  U.S.  1022  (1974);  Rothstein  v.  Wyman,
467  F.2d 226, 236-38  & n.5  (2d  Cir.  1972),  cert. denied, 411  U.S.  921  (1973).
32 In Hans v.  Louisiana the  Court  said  it  would  be  an  "anomalous  result"  to
allow  suit  in  the  one  category  of  cases  and  not  in  the  other.  It  thought  such  a
result would be "startling  and unexpected."  134  U.S.  at  10-11.
33 Suppose  that  Congress,  when  proposing  the  Eleventh  Amendment,  had
appended  to  it  a proviso  that  nothing  therein  contained  should  prevent  a
State  from  being sued  by its  own citizens  in cases  arising under  the  Con-
stitution  or laws  of the United  States:  can we  imagine  that  it would  have
been  adopted  by the  States?  The supposition  that  it  would  is  almost  an
absurdity  on its face.
Hans v. Louisiana,  134  U.S.  1,  15  (1890).
34 Moreover,  the  Eleventh  Amendment  is  not  intended  as  a  mere  formula
of words,  to  be  slurred over by  subtle  methods  of  interpretation,  so  as to
give  it  a literal compliance,  without regarding  its  substantial  meaning  and
purpose.  It is a  grave  and solemn  condition,  exacted  by  sovereign  States,
for the purpose  of preserving  and  vindicating their sovereign  right  to deal
with their creditors  and others  propounding  claims  against  them,  according
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states'  sovereign  immunity  leaves  unexplained  the  source  of  the
sovereign  immunity  of the  federal  government.
Another  theory maintains that Chisholm v.  Georgia  was wrong
and that the purpose  of the eleventh amendment  was  to reverse  en-
tirely  the  Court's  misconceptions  in  Chisholm  and  return  to  the
situation mandated  by the  Constitution itself: 35  a situation of full
sovereign  immunity  for  state  governments,  as  well  as  the  federal
government  (whose  sovereign  immunity  Chisholm  left  unim-
paired 36).  This position,  though nominally one of reliance  on the
eleventh  amendment,  is much  like other  theories  finding sovereign
immunity in the Constitution  as it was adopted in  1787.
Where does the original Constitution provide for this sovereign
immunity?  The  language  usually  discussed  in  this  connection  is
that concerning  the  extent  of "the  judicial  power"  in  article  IIIY.3
The  argument  is  that  the  United  States'  judicial  power  does  not
extend  to  these  suits  against  the state  or federal  governments.  As
Justice  Marshall  explained  in  Employees  of  the  Department of
to  their  own  views  of  what  may  be  required  by  public  faith  and  the
necessities  of the body politic.  We have no right, if we were  disposed,  to
fritter  away  the  substance  of  this  solemn  stipulation  by  any  neat  and
skillful  manipulation  of  its  words.  We  are  bound  to  give  it  its  full  and
substantial  meaning  and effect.  It is  only  thus that  all  public instruments
should  be construed.
Virginia Coupon  Cases,  114 U.S.  269,  332  (dissenting  opinion).  But see id. 337-38.
35 Ex parte New  York,  256  U.S.  490  (1921),  may  exemplify  this  position.  It
speaks  of state  immunity  as  a  "fundamental  rule  of which  the  [Eleventh]  Amend-
ment  is  but  an  exemplification."  Id. 497.  On  the  next  page,  however,  the  Court
talks as though the  eleventh  amendment,  standing alone, supports  all  state  sovereign
immunity  rules.  Id. 498.  The  Court's  view  of  the  precise  source  of  immunity  is
thus somewhat confused.
A  case  that  declines  precisely  to  locate  the  immunity  saying  simply  that  "the
whole  sum  of the  judicial  power  granted  by the  Constitution  of the  United  States
does  not  embrace  the  authority  to  entertain  a suit brought  by  a  citizen  against  his
own  state  without its  consent"  is  Dune v. New  Jersey, 251  U.S.  311,  313  (1920).
36Chisholm  v.  Georgia,  2  U.S.  (2  Dall.)  419,  424  (1793)  (argument  of
Randolph,  for  plaintiff,  conceding  United  States'  immunity);  id. 430  (Iredell,  J.,
dissenting);  id. 469  (opinion  of  Cushing, J.);  id. 478  (opinion  of  Jay,  C.J.).  See
also Monaco  v. Mississippi,  292 U.S.  313,  321  (1934).
37 The judicial Power  shall extend to all  Cases,  in Law and  Equity, arising
under this Constitution,  the Laws  of the United States,  and  Treaties made,
or  which  shall  be  made,  under  their  Authority;-to  all  Cases  affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers  and  Consuls;-to  all  Cases  of admiralty
and  maritime  Jurisdiction;-to  Controversies  to  which  the  United  States
shall  be  a Party;-to  Controversies  between  two  or  more  States;-between
a  State  and  Citizens  of  another  State;-between  Citizens  of  different
States;-between  Citizens  of the  same  State  claiming  Lands  under  Grants
of  different  States,  and  between  a  State,  or  the  Citizens  thereof,  and
foreign  States,  Citizens  or  Subjects.
U.S.  CoNsr.  art.  III,  § 2.
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Public Health and  Welfare v.  Department of Public Health and
Welfare (Government Employees): 38
The root of  the  constitutional  impediment to  the  ex-
ercise  of the  federal judicial  power  in  a  case  such  as  this
is not the Eleventh Amendment but Art. III of our Consti-
tution.  Following  the  decision  in  Chisholm v.  Georgia,
2  Dall. 419  (1793),  in which  this Court held that federal
jurisdiction encompassed  a suit brought  against  a noncon-
senting  State  by  citizens  of  another  State,  the  Eleventh
Amendment  was  introduced  to  clarify  the  intent  of  the
Framers  concerning the reach of the federal judicial power.
See,  e.g.,  Hans v. Louisiana, 134  U.S.,  at  11-14.  It  had
been widely understood  prior to ratification  of  the  Consti-
tution that the provision in  Art. III, § 2, concerning  "Con-
troversies  . . . between  a  State  and  Citizens  of  another
State"  would not  provide  a  mechanism  for making  States
unwilling defendants in  federal court.  The Court in  Chis-
holm, however,  considered  the  plain  meaning  of the con-
stitutional  provision  to  be  controlling.  The  Eleventh
Amendment  served  effectively  to  reverse  the  particular
holding  in  Chisholm, and,  more  generally,  to  restore  the
original  understanding,  see,  e.g.,  Hans v.  Louisiana, [134
U.S.]  at  11-15.  Thus,  despite  the  narrowness  of  the  lan-
guage of the Amendment,  its spirit has  consistently guided
this Court in  interpreting the reach of the federal judicial
power generally, and "it  has become established by repeated
decisions  of  this  court  that  the  entire  judicial  power
granted  by  the  Constitution  does  not  embrace  authority
to  entertain  a  suit  brought  by  private  parties  against  a
State  without  consent  given:  not  one  brought  by citizens
of  another  State,  or  by  citizens  or  subjects  of  a  foreign
State,  because  of the  Eleventh Amendment;  and not even
one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental
rule of which  the Amendment  is but an exemplification,"
Ex  parte New  York,  No.  1,  256  U.S.  490,  497  (1921);
see  Smith v. Reeves, 178  U.S. 436,  447-449  (1900).
One  problem  with  this reasoning  is  that all  agree  that states
may  be  sued  in  federal  courts  with  their  consent-that  once  they
38411  U.S.  279,  291-92  (1973)  (concurring  opinion)  (footnotes  omitted).
Other  statements  indicating  that  states'  immunity,  in  citizen  suits,  derives  directly
from  article III are:  Virginia  Coupon Cases,  114  U.S.  269, 337-38  (1885)  (Bradley,
J.,  dissenting);  Miller,  Service of Process on  State, Local and Foreign Governments
Under Rule 4, Federal Rules  of Civil  Procedure-Some Unfinished Business for the
Rulemakers, 46  F.R.D.  101,  108-09  & n.22  (1969).  See  also Ex  parte New  York,
256  U.S.  490,  497  (1921),  discussed  note  35  supra.
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consent,  the  "judicial  power  of  the  United  States"  does extend  to
this category  of suit.  This  does not fit easily  with  the theory  that
the  suits  are  otherwise  outside  the  "judicial  power";  in  other  in-
stances  limitations on  federal  judicial  power  are  unaffected  by  the
consent  of  the  parties.39  Even  apart from  the  theory  that article
III  is  the source  of immunity, however,  the  same  problem  would
be  encountered  under the eleventh amendment.  It,  too, is  phrased
as a limitation on judicial  power, yet it is  established  that the bar
disappears  upon the  state's  consent  to  suit.40
The  other  problem  with viewing  article  III  as  the source  of
sovereign  immunity is that some parties  are permitted suits against
the  state.  For  example,  a  state  may  sue  another  state,4 1  and  the
United  States  may  sue  a  state.42  How  is  one  to  tell  which  suits
against  sovereignties  are  outside  the  federal  judicial  power,  and
which are not, when nothing in article III's language  differentiates
between  the allowable  suits and  the  forbidden  ones?
In  Monaco v. Mississippi  43 the  Court answered  this  question,
saying  that  sovereign  immunity  limits  the  judicial  power  where
such a limitation  is "inherent  in the  Constitutional  plan": 44
Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal applica-
tion of the words of § 2  of Article III  [granting the Court
jurisdiction  of  various  categories  of  cases,  e.g.,  cases  in
which a State shall  be party],  or assume  that the letter  of
the  Eleventh  Amendment  exhausts  the  restrictions  upon
suits  against  nonconsenting  States.  Behind  the  words  of
the  constitutional  provisions  are  postulates  which  limit
and control ....  There is  ...  the postulate  that States  of
the  Union, still  possessing  attributes  of sovereignty,  shall
be immune  from  suits, without  their consent,  save where
39 13  C.  Wmcmr,  A.  MirLE  & E. CooPER,  FEDERAL  PRATIMCE  AND  PROCEDURE
§ 3522,  at  46  n.6  (1975  & Supp.  1977)  [hereinafter  cited  as  Wmcnr  & Mrru.ai]
(citing  cases);  Louisville  & Nashville  R.R. v. Mottley,  211 U.S.  149  (1908).
40 See cases  cited note 8 supra.
41 Monaco  v.  Mississippi,  292  U.S.  313,  328-29  (1934)  (dictum);  Rhode
Island  v. Massachusetts,  37  U.S.  (12  Pet.)  657,  729  (1838).
4SUnited  States  v.  Mississippi,  380  U.S.  128  (1965);  Monaco  v.  Mississippi,
292 U.S.  313,  329  (1934)  (dictum);  United  States v. Texas,  143  U.S.  621,  644-45
(1892).
43292 U.S.  313  (1934).
44 Id.  329.  See  also  id. 322-24,  330.  The  phrase,  of  course,  could  include
anything.  One  might  find  it  "inherent  in  the  constitutional  plan"  that  all  federal
questions  be  litigable  in federal  court-or  all  federal  constitutional  questions-or  all
subjects  within  Congress'  power, but the  Court  has not so  held.  See  Louisiana  v.
Jumel,  107 U.S.  711  (1883).  But see Cohens  v. Virginia,  19  U.S.  (6  Wheat.)  264,
383,  392,  407  (1821)  (Marshall,  C.J.).
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there has  been  "a surrender  of this immunity in the plan
of the  convention."  The  Federalist, No.  81.
45
Apparently, the Court knows whether this immunity was surrendered
in the plan of the convention by its own  evaluation  of the sense of
the situation.  Entertainment  of suits  between states  "was  essential
to  the  peace  of  the  Union";  46  accordingly,  for  such  suits,  "the
States by the adoption  of the Constitution,  ...  waived  their exemp-
tion  from judicial  power."  47  Similarly,  the ability  of  the  United
States  to sue states  is "inherent  in the constitutional  plan." 48  And
a  foreign  state  may  not  sue  an  unconsenting  state  (the  decision
rendered in Monaco v. Mississippi) because
[c]ontroversies  between  a  State  and  a  foreign  State  may
involve  international  questions  in relation  to  which  the
United States has a sovereign prerogative....  The National
Government,  by virtue  of its  control  of our foreign  rela-
tions is entitled to employ the resources of diplomatic nego-
tiations and  to  effect  such  an  international  settlement  as
may  be  found  appropriate,  through  treaty,  agreement  of
arbitration,  or  otherwise.  It cannot  be  supposed  that  it
was  the  intention  that  a  controversy  growing  out  of  the
action of a State, which  involves  a matter of national con-
cern and which is said  to affect injuriously the interests  of
a foreign State, or a dispute arising from conflicting claims
of a State of the Union and a foreign state as to territorial
boundaries,  should  be  taken out of  the  sphere  of interna-
tional negotiations  and adjustment through a resort by the
foreign State to a suit under the provisions of § 2 of Article
III.  In such a case,  the State has immunity from suit with-
out her consent and the National  Government  is protected
by the provision prohibiting agreements between States and
foreign  powers  in  the absence  of the  consent  of Congress.
While, in  this instance,  the proposed  suit does  not raise a
question  of national  concern,  the  constitutional  provision
which is said to confer jurisdiction should be  construed in
the  light  of  all  its  applications.
49
In short,  the Court decides  on an ad hoc basis which  categories  of
law  suits  are  excluded  from  immunity, according  to its  own  view
whether  the exclusion  is  necessary.
45292  U.S.  at  322-23  (footnote  omitted).
46 Id. 328.
47 Id.
48 Id.  329.
491d.  331-32.
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Article  III's  language  concerning  the  United  States'  judicial
power  is  certainly  not a  very  explicit  basis  on  which  to  rest  the
doctrine  of state  sovereign  immunity  that  has  evolved.  The  posi-
tion nonetheless  finding the immunity rests ultimately upon a view
of  the  Framers'  intent.  There  are  two basic  difficulties  with  this
position, which  will be discussed  in turn:  (1)  it is by no means as
clear  as  has  been  claimed  that  the  Framers  did  intend  states  to
retain  sovereign  immunity;  and  (2)  even  more  basic,  proponents
of sovereign immunity  as a constitutional requirement flowing  from
article  III run  together  two  arguments:  the argument  that  article
III  does not abrogate states'  sovereign  immunity  is  imperceptibly
transformed  into  an  argument  that  article  III  itself  imposes  sov-
ereign  immunity.
2.  Did the  Framers  Intend  Sovereign  Immunity  to  Survive
Article III?-The Possibility of Article III Abrogation
The accepted position has long been that the Framers intended
sovereign  immunity  to  survive  the  Constitution,  as  originally
adopted. 0  The  evidence  generally  set  forth  in  support  is  three
statements-by  no  less  a  threesome  than  Madison,  Marshall,  and
Hamilton-that  the  states were  not, under  the proposed  Constitu-
tion, subject to suit without their consent.
Madison's and Marshall's  statement were  made  in  1788  before
the  Virginia  Convention  in  the  ratification  debates.  Madison
stated:
[The  Supreme  Court's]  jurisdiction  in  controversies
between a state  and  citizens  of another  state  is  much  ob-
jected  to,  and  perhaps  without  reason.  It  is  not  in  the
power of individuals to call any state into court.  The only
operation it can have, is that, if a state should wish to bring
a suit against a citizen, it must be brought before the fed-
eral court.  This  will give  satisfaction to  individuals,  as it
will prevent  citizens,  on  whom a state  may  have a claim,
being dissatisfied with the state courts. ...
But this will not go beyond  the cases  where  they may
be  parties.  A femme  covert may  be  a citizen  of another
state,  but cannot be a party in this court.  A subject of a
50 1  C.  WAwn,,  supra note  2, at  91,  96.  See also cases  and  authorities  cited
note  2 supra.
It  is  clear  that  sovereign  immunity  existed  at  common  law  in  the  American
Colonies  at  the  time  of  the  Revolution,  although  the  sense  of  this  is  open  to
question.  See  C.  JACOBS,  supra note  3,  at  150-52;  Mathis,  The Eleventh  Amend-
ment: Adoption and Interpretation,  2  GA.  L.  REv.  207,  207-11  (1968).
1978]528  UNIVERSITY  OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAW  REVIEW
foreign power, having a dispute with a citizen of this state,
may  carry  it to  the federal  court; but an alien  enemy can-
not bring suit at all.  It  appears  to me that this can have
no operation but this-to give a citizen a right to be heard
in  the  federal  courts;  and  if a state  should condescend  to
be a  party, this  court may  take  cognizance  of it.51
On  the  same  day,  as  part  of  the  same  debate,  John  Marshall  de-
clared:
With respect  to  disputes between a state and the citi-
zens of another state, its jurisdiction has been decried with
unusual vehemence.  I hope that no gentleman will think
that a  state will be  called  at  the bar of the  federal  court.
Is there no such case at present?  Are there not many cases
in which  the legislature  of Virginia  is a party, and yet the
state  is  not sued?  It  is  not rational  to  suppose  that the
sovereign  power should  be  dragged  before  a court.  The
intent  is,  to enable  states  to recover  claims  of individuals
residing in other states.  I contend this construction is war-
ranted by the words.  But, say they, there will be partiality
in it if a state cannot be defendant-if an individual cannot
proceed  to obtain judgment against a state, though he may
be  sued  by  a state.  It  is  necessary  to be  so,  and  cannot
be avoided.  I  see a difficulty in making a state defendant,
which does not prevent  its being plaintiff.  If this be  only
what cannot be avoided, why  object to the system  on that
account?  If  an  individual  has  a  just  claim  against  any
particular state, is it to be presumed  that, on application to
its  legislature,  he  will  not  obtain  satisfaction?  But  how
could  a state  recover  any  claim  from a  citizen  of another
state, without  the  establishment  of these  tribunals? 52
The same  year Alexander  Hamilton  wrote in  The Federalist:
Though  it may  rather  be a  digression  from  the  im-
mediate subject of this paper, I shall take occasion  to men-
tion here a supposition which has excited some alarm upon
very  mistaken  grounds.  It  has  been  suggested  that  an
assignment of the public  securities of one State to the citi-
zens of another, would enable  them to prosecute  that State
in the  federal  courts  for the amount  of those  securities;  a
513  THE  DEBATES  IN  THE  SEVMAL  STATE  CONVENTIONS  ON  THE  ADoIo  OF
Tm  FEDmAL  CONSTITUTION  533  (J.  Elliot  ed.  1836)  [hereinafter  cited  as  ELoTa's
DEBATES].
52 Id. 555-56  (emphasis  in original).
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suggestion  which the following considerations  prove  to be
without foundation.
It  is  inherent  in the nature  of sovereignty not  to be
amenable  to the suit of an individual without its consent.
This  is the general sense, and the general practice  of man-
kind;  and the  exemption,  as  one  of  the attributes  of  sov-
ereignty,  is now enjoyed  by the government of every  State
in  the  Union.  Unless,  therefore,  there  is  a surrender  of
this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain
with the States, and the danger  intimated must be  merely
ideal.  . . . [T]here  is  no color  to pretend  that  the  State
governments  would,  by  the adoption  of  that plan,  be di-
vested of the privilege  of paying  their own debts in  their
own way,  free from  every  constraint but  that which  flows
from the obligations  of good faith.  The contracts between
a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience
of the sovereign, and have  no pretensions  to a compulsive
force.  They confer no right of action, independent  of the
sovereign will.  To what purpose would it be to authorize
suits  against  States  for  the  debts  they  owe?  How  could
recoveries be enforced?  It  is evident, it could not be done
without  waging war against  the  contracting  State;  and  to
ascribe  to the  federal  courts, by mere implication,  and in
destruction  of  a  pre-existing  right  of  the  State  govern-
ments, a  power which would  involve  such a  consequence,
would  be  altogether  forced  and  unwarrantable.53
These  statements  quite  clearly  maintain state  immunity  from
suit,  but  the  history  is by  no  means  as  clear  as  these  statements
standing  alone  would  suggest.  The  conventional  view  accepting
state  immunity  was  established  in  cases  that  simply  ignored  the
historical  evidence  on the  other  side  of the  question.  That  evi-
dence  discloses  disagreement  concerning  the  status  of  states'  sov-
ereign  immunity  among  those  involved in the ratification  process,
53 THm  FDRAusT  No.  81  (A.  Hamilton)  511-12  (B.  Wright  ed.  1961)  (1st
ed.  1788)  (emphasis  in original).
54 E.g.,  Monaco  v.  Mississippi,  292  U.S.  313,  323-25  (1934);  Williams  v.
United States, 289 U.S.  553, 574-77  (1933);  Hans v. Louisiana,  134  U.S.  1  (1890).
Unlike the  other  two  cases,  which  do  not mention  countervailing  arguments,  Hans
says  that  "the  opponents  of  the  Constitution"  made  some  counterarguments,  but
that Madison,  Marshall  and Hamilton  were  correct.  Id. 12-14.  It also  ignores  the
fact that not all of  the Constitution's  supporters  agreed with  Madison,  Marshall  and
Hamilton.
A  recent  case  assembling  historical  sources  but  omitting  all the  evidence  dis-
agreeing with  Madison,  Marshall  and Hamilton  is Edelman  v. Jordan,  415 U.S.  651,
660-62  & n.9  (1974).
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a  disagreement  that  was  not  resolved  when  the  Constitution  was
adopted.55
The  debate  at  that  time  centered  largely  upon  the  meaning
of  constitutional  phrases  conferring  jurisdiction  upon  the  federal
judiciary:  "The  judicial  power  shall  extend  to  ...controversies
..  between a State and Citizens  of another  State;  ...  and between
a State, or the Citizens  thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Sub-
jects."  56  Some persons  claimed  that, by placing within  the federal
judicial  power disputes  between  states and private individuals,  this
language  prevented  states  from  claiming  immunity from  suit and
thus  affirmatively  abrogated  state  sovereign  immunity.  Madison's,
Marshall's  and Hamilton's  statements  were  attempts to refute  those
claims.
The  language  conferring  jurisdiction  "between  a state  and a
citizen  or citizens  of another  state" was  first used by the Committee
of Detail,57 a committee  of five  members  charged  by  the  Constitu-
tional  Convention  with  revision  of  various  resolutions,  including
some  dealing with  the jurisdiction of  the national judiciary.  -The
Committee proposed that "[t]he  jurisdiction of the  Supreme  Court
shall extend  to all  cases  . . . (except such  as  shall regard  territory
or jurisdiction)  between  a State and Citizens  of another  State  . ..
and  between  a  State  or  the  Citizens  thereof  and  foreign  States,
citizens or subjects" 5 -the  language  that, when embodied in article
III,  became  subject  to  a  claim  that  it  abrogated  the  states'  im-
munity.  Two  of  the  five  members  of  the  Committee  of  Detail
(Edmund  Randolph  and  James  Wilson)  supported  that  position
in the ratification debates.59
No consensus  concerning  this issue is  apparent.  The views  of
the  other  three  Committee  members  were  not publicly  expressed,
and there  is no record of relevant discussion  within the Committee.,
There  was  no  discussion  concerning  the  meaning  of  this  passage
in the debate at the Constitutional Convention, nor was  the subject
of sovereign  immunity  mentioned.  The  subject  was  discussed  in
the ratification conventions,  especially  in Virginia,  New York,  and
55 Recent studies discussing  this evidence  are  C.  JACOBS,  supra note 3,  at 27-40;
Nowak,  supra note  3,  at  1425-30.
56 U.S.  CoNsr. art.  HI, § 2.  A  similar  provision  extends  jurisdiction  "to
Controversies  to which  the  United  States  shall  be  a  Party."  The  Supreme  Court
was  also  given  original  jurisdiction  of  "all  Cases  . ..  in  which  a  State  shall  be
Party."  Id.
57 See  2 REcoRDs OF Tvm Fxt-AL CoNvnr Or  OF  1787  at  147  (M.  Farrand
ed.  1937).
58 Id. 186.
59 See text  accompanying  notes  63-64  infra.
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Pennsylvania.6 0  It is in the Virginia debates that we find the Madison
and Marshall assertions  that suit is not allowable against  the states,
as well as many of the assertions that it  is.  The New York conven-
tion  recommended  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution  providing
that  the  Constitution  should  not  "be  construed  to  authorize  any
suit to  be brought against any state,  in any  manner  whatever" "-_
an  amendment  that would have  been  unnecessary  if the  Madison-
Marshall-Hamilton  interpretation had been generally accepted.6 2
Indeed,  in  weight  of  numbers,  the  anti-immunity  comments
clearly  prevail.  As  noted  above,  Edmund  Randolph  and  James
Wilson,  who  had been  members  of  the  Committee  of Detail,  are
on  record  as  thinking  that  the  grant  of  jurisdiction  to  cases  "be-
tween a state  and citizens  of another  state"  made  states  subject  to
suit by private individuals.  At the Pennsylvania  Convention, James
Wilson lauded the "impartiality"  of the Constitution in thus allow-
ing the  individual  citizen  to  "stand  on a just and  equal  footing"
with  the  State  with  which  he  has  a  controversy.63  Edmund  Ran-
dolph, speaking at the Virginia Convention, similarly assumed  that
article III allowed  individuals  to sue states:
I  approve  of  [the  Constitution]  . . . because  it  prohibits
tender-laws,  secures  the widows and orphans, and prevents
the  states  from  impairing  contracts.  I  admire  that  part
which forces Virginia to pay her debts....  When it obliges
us  to tread in the path of virtue, when it takes away  from
the  most influential  man the  power  of directing  our  pas-
sions  to his own  emolument,  and  of trampling  upon jus-
tice,  I hope  to  be  excused when I say,  that, were  it more
objectionable  than  it  is,  I  should  vote  for  the  Union."
Many  who  opposed  ratification  also  thought  that  article  III
abrogated state immunity.  (Indeed, it  is in reply to their assertions
that  Madison's  and  Marshall's  statements  were  made.)  Patrick
00 Letters  appearing  after  Chisholm claimed  that in  the  Massachusetts  conven-
tion  also  fears  had  been  expressed  that  the  judiciary  article  would  render  states
suable  generally,  but supporters  of the  Constitution  had disclaimed  that  interpreta-
tion of article III.  See I C. WAsuax,  supra note  2, at  97 n.1.
612 EL.svcr's  DEBATEs,  supra note 51,  at 409.
62 A  similar  amendment  was  urged  in  Rhode  Island,  C.  JAcoBs,  supra note  3,
at 39  & n.48.  Moreover  in  Virginia,  3 Emaor's  DEBATEs,  supra note  51,  at 660-61,
and  North  Carolina,  4  id.  246,  amendments  were  introduced  that  would  have
excepted  from  the  federal  judicial  power  cases  "where  the  cause  of  action  shall
have originated  before  the  ratification of  this Constitution."  Id.  (quoting  from the
North  Carolina amendment).
63 2 ELIuOT's  DEBATEs,  supra note  51,  at 491.
64 3 Er.  ows  DEBATEs,  supra note  51,  at 207.
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Henry,  speaking in opposition  to  the  Constitution  at the  Virginia
Convention,  said:
It  has  been  sufficiently  demonstrated  that  [the  rights
of the Union] ...  are not secured.  It  sounds might prettily
to  gentlemen,  to  curse  paper  money  and  honestly  pay
debts.  But apply to the situation of America, and you will
find there are thousands and thousands of contracts, whereof
equity  forbids  an  exact  literal  performance.  Pass  that
government, and you will be bound hand and foot.  There
was an immense quantity of depreciated  Continental paper
money  in circulation at  the  conclusion  of the war.  This
money  is  in  the  hands  of  individuals  to  this  day.  The
holders  of this  money  may  call  for  the  nominal  value,  if
this government be adopted.  This state may be compelled
to pay her proportion  of that currency,  pound for pound.
Pass this government, and you will be carried to the federal
court,  (if I understand  that paper right,)  and you will be
compelled to pay shilling for shilling.  I doubt on the sub-
ject;  at least, as a public man, I ought to have  doubts.  A
state  may  be  sued  in  the  federal  court,  by  the  paper  on
your table.  It  appears  to me, then, that the holder of the
paper  money  may require  shilling  for  shilling.  If there
be any latent remedy  to prevent  this, I hope it will  be dis-
covered.
65
Later, in  reply  to  Madison,66  Henry asserted:
As to controversies between  a state  and the citizens  of
another  state,  [Madison's]  construction  of it  is  to me per-
fectly  incomprehensible.  He  says  it will  seldom  happen
that  a state  has  such  demands  on  individuals.  There  is
nothing to warrant such an assertion.  But he says  that the
state may be plaintiff only.  If gentlemen pervert the most
clear expressions, and the usual meaning of the language of
the people, there is an end of all argument.  What says  the
paper?  That  it  shall  have  cognizance  of  controversies
between a state  and citizens  of another  state, without  dis-
criminating  between  plaintiff  and  defendant.  What  says
the  honorable  gentleman?  The  contrary-that  the  state
can only be plaintiff.  When the state is debtor, there is no
reciprocity.  It  seems to me  that gentlemen  may put what
construction  they please on it.  Whatl  is justice to be done
to one party, and not to the other?  If gentlemen  take this
liberty  now, what  will  they  not  do when  our  rights  and
65 Id. 318-19.  See also id. 471,  473-76.
66 See text accompanying  note  51  supra.
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liberties  are in  their power?  He  said  it  was  necessary  to
provide  a  tribunal  when  the  case  happened,  though  it
would  happen but  seldom.  The  power  is  necessary,  be-
cause  New York could not, before  the war, collect  money
from  Connecticut!  The  state  judiciaries  are  so  degraded
that  they cannot  be  trusted.  This  is  a  dangerous  power
which  is thus instituted.67
Similarly George  Mason, speaking  in Virginia,  said:
"To controversies  between  a state  and the  citizens  of an-
other  state."  How  will their jurisdiction  in  this case  do?
Let  gentlemen  look  at  the  westward.  Claims  respecting
those  lands,  every  liquidated  account,  or  other  claim
against  this  state,  will  be  tried  before  the  federal  court.
Is not this  disgraceful?  Is  this state  to be brought  to  the
bar  of  justice  like  a  delinquent  individual?  Is  the  sov-
ereignty of the state  to be arraigned  like  a culprit, or pri-
vate offender?  Will  the  states  undergo  this mortification?
I think this power perfectly unnecessary.  But let us pursue
this subject farther.  What is to be  done if a judgment be
obtained against a state?  Will you  issue  a fieri facias?  It
would  be  ludicrous  to  say  that you  could  put  the  state's
body in jail.  How is the  judgment,  then, to be  enforced?
A  power  which  cannot  be  executed  ought  not  to  be
granted.68
And Richard Henry Lee, writing in 1787  as "The Federal Farmer,"
circulated  a series  of pamphlets  in opposition  to  the  Constitution
that were  influential in both  New York and Virginia.69   On states'
suability he said:
How far it may be proper to admit a foreigner or the citizen
of another state to bring actions against state governments,
which  have  failed in performing  so many,  promises made
during  the war is  doubtful:  How far it may be proper so
to humble a state, as to oblige it to answer to an individual
in a court of law,  is worthy of consideration;  the states are
now subject  to no  such actions;  and  this new jurisdiction
will subject the states, and many defendants  to actions, and
processes,  which  were  not  in  the  contemplation  of  the
parties,  when  the  contract  was  made;  all  engagements
existing  between  citizens  of  different  states,  citizens  and
67 3  ELUio's  DEBATEs,  supra note 51, at 543-44.
68 Id. 526-27.  See  also id. 472.
69 C.  JAcOBS,  supra note 3,  at 36.
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foreigners,  states and foreigners;  and states and citizens  of
other states  were made  the parties contemplating  the rem-
edies then existing on the laws of the states...  and the new
remedy  proposed  to be given in the federal  courts, can be
founded  on no principle  whatever.7 0
It  is  true  that  the  statements  of  Henry,  Mason  and  Lee  that
the  Constitution  abrogated  the  states'  immunity  were  made  as
criticism,  with the aim of opposing ratification  of the Constitution.
They  may  have  been  disingenuous,  in  order  to accomplish  their
object, just as  the statements  of  Madison,  Marshall  and Hamilton
may  have  discounted  the  possibility  that article  III  abrogated  im-
munity,  in order  to assuage  states-rightists'  fears.71  Randolph and
Wilson,  however,  approved  the  anti-immunity  interpretation  and
supported the ratification of the Constitution.  So did Tench Coxe,
who wrote that because  of the jurisdictional  grant  "when a dispute
arises  between the citizens  of any state  ...  and ...  the  government
of  another,  the  private  citizen  will  not  be  obliged  to  go  into  a
court  constituted  by  the state,  with  which  .. .his  dispute  is."  72
Edmund  Pendleton  was  also  a  supporter  of  the  Constitution  who
apparently  believed  that  the  Constitution  empowered  individual
citizens  to sue  the states.73
Surely  this  history supports,  at least,  a  lack  of  consensus  con-
cerning  the  status  of  sovereign  immunity  when  the  Constitution
was  ratified.74  Indeed another  piece of evidence  that not all agreed
70 R.  H.  Ix,  LETTEBS  OF A  FEDERAL  FAvm  (NUMMER  III)  (Oct.  10,  1787),
reprinted in PAmPEmEts  ON  THE CONSTUON  OF THE  UNIT=D  STATES  309  (P.  Ford
ed.  1888).
71 C.  JACOBS,  supra note 3, at 34, 39.  Evidence that their stated positions  were
disingenuous  may be  found  in  THE  FEDmALST  No.  80  (A.  Hamilton),  discussed
infra note  75  & accompanying  text;  and  in  Marshall's  statement,  made  some  years
later  when  he  was  Chief  justice,  that  article  III  did  permit  suits  against  states.
Cohens v. Virginia,  19  U.S.  (6  Wheat.)  264, 412  (1821)  ("in  its origin, the judicial
power  was  extended  to  all  cases  arising  under  the  Constitution  or  laws  of  the
United  States, without  respect to parties").
72T.  CoxE,  AN  ExAmINATIoN  (NUmBER  IV)  19  (1788),  reprinted in P.m-
PHLETs  ON  THE  CON sITUTION  OF  THE UNI  D  STATES  149  (P.  Ford  ed.  1888).
Coxe,  a  Pennsylvanian,  was a member  of the Continental  Congress.  The cited  tract
was  among the  first pro-ratification  pamphlets  to  appear  and  reportedly  was  widely
circulated.  Id. 133.
73 Guthrie,  The  Eleventh  Article of  Amendment  to  the  Constitution of  the
United States, 8  COLum.  L.  REv.  183,  184  (1908).  See  also  Pendleton's  defense
of the judiciary  article, 3  EraoT's  DEBATES,  supra note  51,  at 549.
74 The chronology  of  the  Virginia  Convention  as  well  supports  the  view  that
the  Madison-Marshall  argument  was  made  to  counter the  anti-federalists  and,  also,
suggests  that it  did not  necessarily  prevail.  Edmund  Randolph  first  mentioned  the
issue  of  state  suability  at  the  Convention  when  he  praised  the  Constitution  for
including  it.  Henry's  and  Mason's  statements  followed,  detailing  the  dire  conse-
quences  to  the  states  that  would  follow  from  "forcing  them  to  pay,  shilling  for
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with  the  Madison-Marshall-Hamilton  pro-immunity  statements
comes  from  The Federalist  80,  in which  Hamilton  himself, in the
paper immediately  preceding  the much quoted one supporting  im-
munity,  indicates  that  states  can  be  sued  by  private  citizens  and
that  this  is  to  be  applauded.75  And  the  influx  of  private  suits
against the states,  commenced  as soon as the national judiciary was
shilling".  In fact there  was  a  long  discussion,  joined  in by  others  as  well,  on the
Constitution's  financial  implications  for  state  treasuries.  It  is  at  this  point  that
Madison  came  up  with  the- argument  that  states  could not  be  sued,  an  argument
that  was  answered  by  Henry,  then  reiterated  by  Marshall.  Randolph  concluded
discussion  of the  subject  at the  Virginia  Convention;  his  view  apparently  remained
that the  Constitution  made states  suable by  individual  citizens  and  that  it was  the
better for this  provision.  See 3  ELuoT's  DEBATES,  supra note 51  (record  of  Virginia
ratification  convention).
75 Hamilton  speaks  of  "[t]he power  of  determining  causes  . ..between  one
State and  the  citizens  of  another"  as  "essential  to  the  peace  of  the  Union."  THE
FEDE  BAisT  No.  80  (A.  Hamilton)  501  (B.  Wright  ed.  1961)  (1st  ed.  1788).
One  could  read  this  consistently  with  The  Federalist No.  81,  however,  by  saying
only  suits by  states  against  individuals  are  contemplated.  Hamilton  also  refers  in
The  Federalist No.  80  to  the  need  always  to  have  "a  constitutional  method  of
giving  efficacy  to  constitutional  provisions.  What,  for  instance,  would  avail  restric-
tions  on  the  authority  of  State  legislatures,  without  some  constitutional  mode  of
enforcing  the  observance  of  them?"  Id.  500.  The  prohibitions  on  the  states  he
proceeds  to list, however,  are  ones  in  which the  plaintiff  in  an  enforcement  action
would  as  likely be  the United  States  as an individual  citizen;  "[tlhe  imposition  of
duties  on  imported  articles,  and  the  emission  of  paper  money"  were  given  as
examples;  violation  of the  contract clause  was  not.
Further  on,  however,  The  Federalist No.  80  more  clearly  envisions  suits  by
individuals  against states.
It may be esteemed  the basis  of the  Union,  that  "the citizens  of each
State  shall  be  entitled  to  all  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens  of
the  several  States."  And  if  it be  a  just  principle  that  every  government
ought to possess the means of executing its own provisions by  its authority,
it will follow,  that in  order to the  inviolable  maintenance  of  that  equality
of privileges  and  immunities  to  which  the  citizens  of  the  Union  will  be
entitled, the national  judiciary  ought  to  preside  in  all  cases  in  which  one
State or its citizens  are opposed  to another State or its  citizens.  To secure
the  full  effect  of  so  fundamental  a  provision  against  all  evasion  and
subterfuge, it is necessary that its  construction should be  committed to that
tribunal which, having no  local  attachments,  will be  likely to  be impartial
between  the different States  and their citizens,  and which,  owing  its official
existence  to the Union, will never be  likely to  feel any  bias inauspicious  to
the  principles  on  which it  is  founded.
Id.  502  (emphasis  in  original).  While  Hamilton's  statement  is  not  absolutely
explicit  on  the  point,  it almost  certainly  contemplates  suit  against  the  state  by  an
individual.  He  does  not  suggest  that  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  which  he
speaks  can  be  raised  only  defensively.  Moreover  the  privileges  and  immunities
would not  be secured for  individual  defendants  if the state  as plaintiff could  choose
to proceed  in the state rather  than the federal forum.  (In  fact, in the  first Judiciary
Act,  federal  and  state  courts  were  given  concurrent  jurisdiction  over  these  cases,
Judiciary Act  of 1789,  ch. 20,  § 11,  1  Stat.  78  (current version  at 28  U.S.C.  § 1332
(1970)),  and  no  provision  was  made  for removal  of  these  cases,  id. § 12.)  The
Federalist  No.  80  statement, therefore,  rather clearly  assumes  that  states  are  subject
to suit by  another state's  citizens.
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established,76  is  further  evidence  that  it  was  not  clear  to  all  that
the states'  immunity persisted.
The  Supreme  Court's  holding  in  Chisholm v.  Georgia that
states  may be  sued by citizens  of other states was not therefore  the
clear contravention  of a general understanding that it has long been
said to  be.77  Chisholm was,  however,  the first  Supreme  Court de-
cision  to  be  overturned  by  constitutional  amendment:  Chisholm
was repudiated in the eleventh amendment, removing suits between
a  state  and  citizens  of  another  state  from  the  federal  judicial
power.
7 8
3.  If Sovereign Immunity Survived,  In  What Form Did It  Do So?-
The  Importance  of Distinguishing  Between  Article  III
Imposition  and Article III Neutrality
In  attempting  to  divine  the  significance  of  all  this  history
today, it is instructive  to observe  that the  debate  traced  above con-
cerning  the significance  of article III  to states'  sovereign  immunity
reflects  two basic  positions.  One  (espoused by Randolph and Wil-
son, among  others, and adopted  by  the Court in  Chisholm) is that
article  III took away the states' immunity by granting federal  court
jurisdiction  over  suits  to  which  states  were  parties;  the  other  (ad-
vocated by Madison,  Marshall, and the Hamilton of The Federalist
81)  is  that  article  III  did  not  affect  states'  immunity  but  left  it
unimpaired.  These  two  positions  I  will  refer  to as  constitutional
76 1  C.  WARRE,  supra note  2,  at  91-93.  The initial  Supreme  Court  cases  are
Vanstophorst  v.  Maryland,  2  U.S.  (2  Dall.)  401  (1791);  Oswald  v.  New  York,
2  U.S.  (2  Dall.)  401  (1792);  Indiana  Co.  v.  Virginia  (not  reported;  see  1  C.
WAREN,  supra note  2,  at  92  n.1.).  For  a  detailed  account  of  Vanstophorst and
Oswald, as well  as of  Chisholm and  other  suits  against  states  brought shortly  after
Chisholm,  see  Mathis,  The  Eleventh  Amendment:  Adoption  and  Interpretation,
2 GA.  L.  REv.  207,  215-30  (1968).
77 The  two  members  of the  Committee  of  Detail  who  were  on  record  as  be-
lieving  that  article  III  abrogated  sovereign  immunity  played  prominent  roles  in
Chisholm.  James  Wilson  wrote  one  of  the  majority  opinions;  Edmund  Randolph
represented  the plaintiff.  Randolph  was  also Attorney  General of  the United  States
at  the  time.
7 8  Historians are divided  concerning  the strength  of the  reaction  to  Chisholm v.
Georgia.  1  C.  WARREN,  supra note  2, at 96-101;  Nowak,  supra note 3,  at  1433-41.
See  also  C.  JAcoBs,  supra note  3,  at  55-66.  Clearly  there  was  outrage  at  the
decision,  at  least  on  the  part  of  some.  One  newspaper  writer  blamed  the  result
on  "the  'craft  and  subtility  of  lawyers'  [who]  had  introduced  this  clause  into  the
Constitution  as  'the  plan  of  all  aristocrats  to  reduce  the  States  to  corporations."'
Another  claimed that the decision  "involved more  danger  to the liberties  of America
than  the  claims  of  the  British  Parliament  to  tax  us  without  our  consent."  I  C.
WAr,  supra note  2,  at  97  (quoting  contemporary  newspapers).  The  Georgia
House  of  Representatives  responded  to  the  decision  by  enacting  a  provision  that
anyone  attempting  to  execute  process  in  Chisholm will  be  "guilty  of  felony  and
shall suffer  death, without benefit  of clergy, by being hanged."  Id.  100.
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abrogation  of  states'  immunity  and  constitutional  neutrality  on
the question.  Article  III  is sometimes  read  today,  however,  to  go
beyond either  of  these  positions;  it  is  sometimes  taken  to  impose
sovereign  immunity  as  a  constitutional  requirement. 7 9
It  is ironic that  the same  constitutional language-article  III's
language  concerning  the  extent of the  judicial power-should  con-
stitute  the textual support both for  the position  that the Constitu-
tion requires  immunity and  for the  position that  the Constitution
prohibits it.  The position  that article  III imposes a constitutional
requirement  of  immunity  surely  goes  beyond anything  argued  in
the  constitutional  debates.  It  has  no  historical  support.  Neither
constitutional  language  nor constitutional  intent provide  any  basis
for it.
Hans v. Louisiana  80  (the  case  initially  holding  that sovereign
immunity  extends  to  citizen  suits)  seemingly  did  not  view  the
immunity  as  a  constitutional  requirement.  That  case  is  wholly
consistent  with  the  view  that  sovereign  immunity  survived  article
III as only a common law doctrine.  The Court there did not speak
of article  III creating  an immunity,  though it  forcefully contended
that  the  article  left  preexisting  sovereign  immunity  unimpaired.8
The position that article III imposes  immunity has developed more
recently.  Seemingly  it  evolved  simply  by  courts  misreading  the
Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton arguments for constitutional neu-
trality,  thus  running  together  two  very  different  positions.  Mr.
Justice  Marshall's  opinion  in  Government  Employees,  set  out
above,  is  typical.82   The  finding  (relying  on  Marshall,  Madison
79 Employees  of  Dep't of  Public Health  and  Welfare  v. Department  of Public
Health  and  Welfare,  411  U.S.  279,  291  (1973)  (Marshall,  J.,  concurring)  and.
cases  cited in note 82 infra.
80 134  U.S.  1  (1890).
81 The  opinion describes  the issue facing  the Chisholm Court  as whether  article
I's  language  created  "a power to  enable  the  individual  citizens  of one  State  ...
to sue another State  of the Union in the federal  courts,"  or whether  instead  "it was
not the  intention  to  create  new  and  unheard  of  remedies,  by  subjecting  sovereign
States  to  actions  at the  suit  of  individuals,  (which  [Justice  Iredell  in  Chisholml
...  conclusively  showed  was  never  done before,)  but  only,  by  proper  legislation,
to  invest  the  federal  courts  with  jurisdiction  to  hear  and  determine  controversies
and  cases,  between  the parties  designated,  that were  properly  susceptible  of litiga-
tion in courts."  Id.  12.  See  also id. 15,  16,  18.
The only  language  in the Hans opinion that  suggests  sovereign  immunity  as  a
constitutional  requirement  is  the  statement  that  it  is  "inherent  in  the  nature  of
sovereignty."  Id. 13,  quoting THE  FEDERALIST  No.  8.  Read  as  a whole,  however,
the  opinion  indicates  sovereign  immunity  survived  article  III but not  as  a  consti-
tutional  requirement.
Hans v. Louisiana  is  consistent with  a common  law view of sovereign immunity
in non-citizen  suits  as  well.  See notes  90-94  infra and  accompanying  text.
82 See  text  accompanying  note  38  supra.  For  other  examples,  see  Monaco  v.
Mississippi,  292  U.S.  313,  323-25,  329-30  (1934);  Smith v.  Reeves,  178  U.S.  436,
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and  Hamilton)  that  the  Constitution  does  not  "provide  a  mech-
anism for making  States  unwilling  defendants  in  federal  court"  is
silently  transformed  into  a  prohibition,  in  the judicial  power lan-
guage,  against hearing  the  suits  at  issue.  Why  article  III  is  read
to  impose  sovereign  immunity  rather  than  leave  it  unaffected  is
unexplained.  Thus  the  article  III  language  has  come  to  be  read
to support a position quite foreign  to any of the contemporary  posi-
tions concerning  its  meaning.
In sum, the proper approach is  to find in the historical sources
contemporary  with  the  ratification  of  the  Constitution  some  sup-
port for a view that article III abrogated states' immunity and some
support  for  a  view  that  it  did  not-that  instead  it  left  sovereign
immunity  unaffected.  In  that  case,  sovereign  immunity  did  sur-
vive  the  Constitution,  but  it  survived  as  a  common  law  require-
ment.  Historical  sources  do  not support  the  position  that article
III imposes  a requirement  of sovereign  immunity.  The  view that
article  III abrogates  immunity  is  discredited  today.  Rejection  of
that  position  is  supportable  either  by  focusing  on  the  Madison-
Marshall-Hamilton  statements  and  saying  that  they,  rather  than
contrary  statements,  embody  the "constitutional  intent";  or by  say-
ing  that  at  any  rate  the  reaction  to  Chisholm and  the  eleventh
amendment  show  a  repudiation  of  the  abrogation  position.  By
either route one arrives at a view that sovereign immunity survives
article  III  but  is not  required  by  it.  This  position  is  consistent
with the statements  of Madison, Marshall and Hamilton that article
III  does  not require  the  abrogation  of sovereign  immunity;  they
nowhere  claim  that article  III required  its  imposition.  Sovereign
immunity survives the adoption of the Constitution,  then, but it  is
subject  to modification  or even  abandonment  by processes  short of
constitutional  amendment.
4. The  Effect of the Eleventh Amendment
How does the eleventh amendment affect the status of sovereign
immunity?  13s
One possibility  would be to hold that the intent of the amend-
ment was  solely  to  repudiate  the  theory  that  article III  abrogated
judicial  immunity  and  to  revert  to  the  Madison-Marshall-Hamil-
449  (1900);  Virginia  Coupon  Cases,  114  U.S.  269,  337-38  (1885)  (dissenting
opinion).  Cf. Williams  v. United  States,  289  U.S.  553,  573-77  (1933)  (immunity
of  United  States  constitutionally  mandated,  on  analogy  to  state  immunity  thought
to be conferred by article  m  and  eleventh  amendment).
83 See  cases  cited note 31 supra for the proposition that the amendment  imposes
immunity not  only for  cases  within its terms  but  in citizen  suits  as  well.
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ton  view  expressed  in  the ratification  debates.  Thus  the  amend-
ment  adds  nothing  to  our  interpretation  of article  III:  sovereign
immunity  is  not  abrogated  by  the  Constitution  but  neither  is  it
constitutionally required;  it  survives  as a "pre-existing  right of the
State  governments,"  84  as  a  well-established  doctrine  of  common
law  that  "[ilt  is  inherent  in  the  nature  of  sovereignty  not  to  be
amenable  to the suit of an individual without  its consent."  4
To  say  that  not even  the  eleventh  amendment  imposes  sov-
ereign  immunity  as  a constitutional requirement  is a bit startling.
No Justice of the Supreme Court takes this position." 6  The Justice
who is the greatest proponent of a common law status for sovereign
immunity  is  Mr. Justice  Brennan.  He  believes  that sovereign  im-
munity  had  only  common  law  status  after  ratification ,of  article
111. 7  But  he  has  never  questioned  the  established  interpretation
of  the  eleventh  amendment  as  imposing  a  constitutional  require-
ment  of  immunity  for  those  cases  within  its  literal  terms  (suits
brought  by  "Citizens  of  another  State,  or  by  Citizens  or  Subjects
of  any  Foreign  State").  His  most  important  difference  with  the
Court, then, concerns whether a constitutional  doctrine of immunity
covers  suits by a state's  own citizens.  If  the  eleventh  amendment
8S4TH  FEDE  B A  T No.  81  (A.  Hamilton).
85 Id.  511  (B.  Wright ed.  1961)  (emphasis  deleted).
S 86Indeed  the  only  case  support  is  Hans  v.  Louisiana,  134  U.S.  1  (1890).
And  even though  I believe  that  Hans' language  shows  sovereign  immunity  is  only
a  common  law  requirement,  see  text  accompanying  notes  90-94  infra,  the  case
generally  has not been  so interpreted.
87 Justice  Brennan  believes that article  i  is  not a jurisdictional bar  to  federal
courts  entertaining  suits  against the  states;  it is  neutral  on  the  subject  of  sovereign
immunity,  permitting  "the  nonconstitutional  but  ancient  doctrine  of  sovereign  im-
munity,"  Edelman  v. Jordan,  415  U.S.  651,  687  (1974)  (Brennan,  J.,  dissenting),
to survive, but not  itself imposing the  doctrine.  See  Employees  of  Dep't  of Public
Health  and  Welfare  v.  Department  of  Public  Health  and  Welfare,  411  U.S.  279,
315-19  (1973)  (Brennan,  J.,  dissenting).  Further,  Justice  Brennan  believes  that
"'at least  insofar  as  the  States  granted  Congress  specifically  enumerated  powers,"
Edelman  v.  Jordan,  415  U.S.  651,  687  (1974),  they  surrendered  their  immunity
when  they  ratified  the  Constitution.  The  eleventh  amendment  reimposed  their
immunity but  only  for the  other  suits  explicitly  mentioned  in  the  amendment.  It
did not  affect  the  common  law  status  of  the  doctrine  in  citizen  suits.  Therefore
when  Congress,  acting  within  its  article  I  (or  other)  powers,  subjects  states  to
federal  suit,  its  enactments,  when  applied  to  citizen  suits,  do  not  collide  with  any
state right to immunity.  See Employees  of Dep't  of Public  Health  and  Welfare  v.
Department  of Public  Health  and Welfare,  411 U.S.  279,  299-301,  309-10  (1973).
See Parden v. Terminal  Ry.,  377  U.S.  184  (1964).
Justice  Brennan has not discussed  the  effects  of his view of sovereign  immunity
on judicial development  of the immunity  doctrines.  The subject will be explored in
the  next  article  in  this  series.
1978]540  UNIVERSITY  OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAW  REVIEW
imposes a constitutional  doctrine of immunity at all, it makes sense
thus to limit it to its  terms.88
But the amendment  need not be read  to impose immunity as a
constitutional  requirement.  Sovereign  immunity  may  be  only  a
common  law  doctrine  in  noncitizen as  well  as  citizen  suits.  It  is
perfectly  possible  for  a constitutional  amendment  not  to  impose  a
constitutional  requirement,  but  instead  only  to  overturn  a consti-
tutional interpretation  that the Supreme  Court has rendered.  The
eleventh  amendment  on  its  face  does  not  reveal  whether  the  sov-
ereign  immunity  doctrine  has  constitutional  status.  And reading
the amendment  only to  restore  sovereign  immunity  as  a  common
law  doctrine  makes  more  sense  than  any  of  the  alternatives, 9  in
view  of  the wording  of  the  amendment  and  its historical  context.
88 Despite the  contrary reasoning  in Hans v. Louisiana, see notes  32  & 33 supra
and  accompanying  text,  it  seems  proper  to  accept  the  express  limitations  on  the
constitutional  provision,  even  if  those  limitations  seem  irrational.  Furthermore,
there may  have been reasons  for  distinguishing citizen  and  noncitizen  suits,  even  if
the  eleventh  amendment  did  impose  a  constitutional  immunity  requirement.  Pos-
sibly the amendment's  framers overlooked  citizen suits  (or  even  intentionally omitted
them)  because  they  did  not  then  exist.  Siace  Congress  had  not  granted  federal
question  jurisdiction  to  the  federal  courts,  there  was  no  jurisdictional  basis  upon
which  the  suits  could  rest.  Indeed,  except  for a one-year  period  starting  in  1801,
Judiciary Act  of 1801,  ch.  4,  § 11,  2  Stat.  92  (repealed  by  Judiciary  Act  of  1802,
ch.  8,  § 1,  2  Stat.  132),  Congress  would  not  grant  general  federal  question  juris-
diction until 1875.  Judiciary Act of 1875, ch.  137,  § 1,  18  Stat. 470  (current  version
at 28 U.S.C.  § 1331  (1970)).  Starting  in  the  1860's, however,  Congress  did place
a series  of Civil Rights  Acts  within the federal  jurisdiction.  See W  Ginr  & MLrr.,
supra note  39, at  § 3561 nn.3  & 4;  id. § 3573.
If this  explanation  is  accepted,  then when  citizen  suits were  placed  within  the
federal  jurisdiction,  sovereign  immunity  governed  those  cases  only  as  a  common
law  doctrine;  even  if  the eleventh  amendments  Framers  would  not  have  desired  a
different  doctrine  to  prevail  in  citizen  and  noncitizen  suits,  they  simply  had  not
included  citizen  suits  within  their  amendment.  Hans  v.  Louisiana,  134  U.S.  1
(1890),  which first  held  states  immune  from  federal  suit  by  their  own  citizens,  is
not inconsistent  with this  argument.  See note  81  supra.  It is  only after  Hans that
the  Court has  unambiguously  (and,  I think, with  Mr.  Justice  Brennan,  incorrectly)
claimed  constitutional  status  for  sovereign  immunity  in  citizen  suits.  See  cases
cited  note  4 supra.
If  courts  were  to  follow  Justice  Brenan's  view  that  immunity  is  a  constitu-
tional requirement in noncitizen  suits only,  Congress could  allow most  claims  against
states  to  be prosecuted  by  altering  the  common  law  immunity  doctrine  governing
suits  by  a  state's  own  citizens.  In  impact,  therefore,  Justice  Brennan's  immunity
doctrine  would not differ  drastically from  this Article's  proposal.
89 Recent  commentary  has  proliferated  the  number  of  eleventh  amendment
interpretations.  Under  one  view,  sovereign  immunity,  though  a  constitutional  re-
quirement,  only  prohibits  incursions  by  the  federal  judiciary  and  leaves  Congress
free to adjust  the  immunity  to  modem needs.  Nowak,  supra note  3;  Tribe,  Inter-
governmental  Immunities  in  Litigation, Taxation,  and  Regulation:  Separation of
Powers Issues in Controversies About  Federalism, 89  HuI&v.  L.  REV.  682,  683-99
(1976).  This view, which resembles the Court majority's approach, will  be analyzed
further in my  article  on  congressional  power  to abridge  states'  immunity.  Another
author  argues  that  the eleventh  amendment  sustains  state  immunity  against  federal
suit on state-created  causes  of action  only.  Cullison,  supra note  2.  Baker, Federal-
ism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48  U.  CoLo.  L.  REv.  139  (1977),  suggests  that
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There  is nothing in the history of the eleventh amendment to
cast doubt upon the interpretation set out above-that its sole  effect
was to allow sovereign immunity to survive article III as a common
law requirement.  The  one  thing  that  is  clear about  the  amend-
ment  is  that  its  purpose  was  to  overturn  Chisholm v.  Georgia, as
the suggested interpretation would most certainly do.  The question
is, however, just how broad this overturning was to be.  The amend-
ment  passed without  debate, and  contemporary  indications  of  the
intended scope  of the amendment  are not available.
There  is an argument from Hans v. Louisiana that supports a
common  law  view  of  sovereign  immunity  even  for  cases  unam-
biguously  within  the  eleventh  amendment.  In  Hans the  Court
said  the  purpose  of  the  amendment  was  to  write  into  law  the
Iredell  dissent  in  Chisholm.9"  That  dissent  clearly  took  the  posi-
tion that state  sovereign  immunity survived as a common  law  doc-
trine, not that the doctrine  had constitutional  force.  Because  Jus-
tice Iredell found that no statutes, before or after the Constitution,
purported to alter common  law  doctrine,91 he  saw the central issue
as
whether, previous  to  the adoption of the constitution...
an  action  of  the  nature  like  this  before  the  court  could
have been maintained  ...  upon the principles  of the com-
mon law, which I have shown to be alone applicable.  If it
could, I think it is now maintainable here: If it could not,
I think, as the law stands at present, it is not maintainable;
whatever opinion may be entertained upon the construction
courts  have  continually  departed  from the  constitutional  language  to  vindicate  pre-
vailing principles  of federalism.  Finally,  C.  JAcoBs,  supra  note  3,  at  162-63,  like
Justice  Brennan,  advocates  restriction  of  the  effect  of  the  eleventh  amendment  to
its  explicit ban on  noncitizen suits.
None  of these  takes  the  position  herein  advocated,  that  sovereign  immunity is
altogether  a  common  law  doctrine.
90 Hans  v. Louisiana,  134  U.S.  1,  12,  14,  18-19  (1890).  Justice  Iredell,  the
only  dissenter  in  Chisholm, had  presided  in  the  suit  when  Chisholm  brought  it
against  Georgia  in  the  circuit  court.  There  as  well  he  had  ruled  that  Georgia
could not be sued.  Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation,
2  GA.  L. RBv. 207, 218  (1968).
91 Justice  Iredell said the  Court  lacked  jurisdiction because  "there  is no  doubt,
that  neither in the  state  now  in question,  nor  in any  other  in  the  Union,  any  par-
ticular  legislative  mode,  authorizing  a  compulsory  suit  for the  recovery  of  money
against  a state, was  in  being,  either when the  -constitution was  adopted,  or  at the
time the judicial  act was passed."  Chisholm v. Georgia,  2  U.S.  (2 Dall.)  419,  434
(1793)  (Iredell,  J.,  dissenting).  He  went on  to  say  "it is  certain,  that  in  regard
to any  common-law  principle which  can influence  the  question  before us, no  altera-
tion has been made by any statute, which could  occasion the least material  difference,
or have  any  partial  effect."  Id.  And  further,  "If, therefore,  no  new  remedy  be
provided  .. .we  have  no  other rule  to  govern  us,  but the  principles  of  the  pre-
existent laws,  which must remain in force until superseded by others  .... "  Id. 436.
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of  the  Constitution,  as  to  the  power  of  Congress  to  au-
thorize such a one.9 2
After a long discussion  of the  common  law principles  of sovereign
immunity, Justice  Iredell  concluded
[t]hat  there  are no  principles  of the old law,  to which  we
must have recourse, that in any manner authorize the pres-
ent suit, either  by  precedent  or  by analogy.  The  conse-
quence of which, in my opinion,  clearly is, that the suit in
question cannot be  maintained, nor, of course, the motion
made  upon it be complied with.93
At the end  of his opinion, Justice  Iredell  again made  clear that his
position, finding immunity in the state, did not rest upon a consti-
tutional  basis:
So far  as this  great question  affects  the- constitution  itself,
if  the  present  afforded,  consistently  with  the  particular
grounds  of my  opinion,  a proper- occasion  for  a  decision
upon it,  I would not shrink from its discussion.  But it is of
extreme moment that no judge should rashly commit him-
self upon important  questions,  which  it is  unnecessary  for
him  to decide.  My opinion being, that even if the consti-
tution would admit of the exercise  of such a power, a new
law is necessary for the purpose, since no part of the exist-
ing law  applies,  this  alone  is  sufficient  to  justify  my  de-
termination  in the present case.94
92 Id.
9s Id.  449.
94 Id.  Iredell  then went  on to state:
So  much,  however,  has  been  said  on the  constitution,  that  it  may  not  be
improper  to  intimate  that  my  present  opinion  is  strongly  against  any
construction of it, which will admit, under any  circumstances,  a compulsive
suit against  a state for the recovery  of money.  I  think  every  word in  the
constitution  may  have  its  full  effect  without  involving  this  consequence,
and  that  nothing  but  express  words,  or  an  insurmountable  implication
(neither  of which  I consider,  can be found in  this case),  would  authorize
the deduction  of so  high a power.  This  opinion  I hold,  however,  with  all
the reserve proper  for one, which,  according to  my sentiments  in this  case,
may:be  deemed in some measure  extra-judicial.  With regard  to the policy
of maintaining  such suits,  that  is not for  this  court to  consider, unless  the
point in all other respects  was very doubtful.  Policy might then be argued
from  with a view to preponderate  the judgment.  Upon the  question before
us,  I  have  no  doubt.  I  have  therefore  nothing  to  do  with  the  policy.
But I  confess,  if I was  at liberty to speak  on  that  subject,  my  opinion  on
the policy  of the  case, would  also  differ from that of the  attorney  general.
It is, however,  a delicate topic.  I pray to God, that if the attorney general's
doctrine,  as  to  the  law,  be  established by  the  judgment  of  this  court,  all
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If  the purpose  of the  eleventh amendment  truly  was  to  write
Iredell's  opinion into law,  then  its purpose was  to allow  sovereign
immunity to survive as a common law requirement.
At first reading it  may  seem  that the wording  of the  eleventh
amendment  is  an  obstacle  to  viewing  the  amendment  as  simply
restoring immunity to  its pre-Constitution position.  The problem
lies in the provision  that the "[j]udicial  power of  the United States
shall  not be  construed  to  extend  to"  the  cases  in  question.  Gen-
erally  the United States'  judicial power must  "extend  to" a class  of
cases  for the  federal judiciary to be able to  hear those  cases at all.
Thus the  "extend  to"  language  of the amendment  can be  deemed
to  prohibit  federal  courts,  as  a  constitutional  matter,  from  enter-
taining the cases  mentioned.  This interpretation,  however,  has its
own difficulties,  because  in some  ways  the  cases  are not deemed to
be  outside  the United  States' judicial  power:  it  is well-established
that federal courts may hear the suits upon'the sovereign's consent.95
Jurisdiction  of  other  cases  outside  the  judicial  power  cannot  be
conferred  upon  federal  courts  by consent;  91  in other  contexts,  the
judicial  power  limitation  is absolute.
The  judicial  power  language  can be  interpreted to  avoid  this
difficulty,  and  the  interpretation  that  does  so  leaves  sovereign  im-
munity in a common-law  status.  The provision that the "[]udicial
power  of the United States shall not be construed  to extend to" cer-
tain classes of cases may  mean simply  that the language  should  not
be  deemed affirmatively to  allow the prosecution  of  those  cases,  as
it had been deemed  to do in  Chisholm.  The eleventh  amendment
then  would  simply  overturn  Chisholm's abrogation  of  sovereign
immunity.  The cases the amendment enumerates would be  outside
the judicial power only in the sense that the judicial power language
of article  III does  not compel  that they  be heard.
In addition  to  avoiding the  anomaly  of consent  seemingly  ex-
panding  the United  States'  judicial  power, a  common-law  reading
of  sovereign  immunity  removes  two  other  conceptual  difficulties
the  good  he predicts  from  it may  take  place,  and  none  of the  evils  with
which,  I have the  concern  to say, it appears  to me to be pregnant.
Id. 449-50.  The  Court  in Hans was not referring  to this  discussion, but to Iredell's
development  of  his  principal  common  law  argument,  when  it  adopted  Iredell's
views  as  its  own.  This  is  clear  from  Hans,  in  which  Iredell's  common  law
arguments  are discussed  extensively.  See  134 U.S.  at  12-19.
95 See cases  cited note  8 supra.
96 Generally  the  rule  is  that the  article  HI  judicial  power  cannot  be  expanded
by  consent  of  the  parties,  Louisville  & Nashville  R.R.  v.  Mottley,  211  U.S.  149
(1908),  or  by  congressional  legislation,  Marbury  v.  Madison,  5  U.S.  (1  Cranch)
137  (1803).
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with the conventional view that article III and the eleventh  amend-
ment  impose  a  constitutional requirement  of sovereign  immunity.
First,  a  similar  rationale  is  provided  for  the  sovereign  immunity
of  the federal  government and  for state  sovereign immunity  in all
the suits  where it  exists:  the scope  of federal  immunity  and of all
types  of  state  immunity  is  basically  the  same  because  they  have
the same source, the common law of sovereign immunity.97  Second,
and most compelling, the omission of suits by a state's  own citizens
from  the  language  of the  eleventh  amendment  makes  sense  under
this  interpretation.  Under  the  conventional  view  of  the  amend-
ment, the omission  seems irrational;  indeed the Supreme  Court has
found it sufficiently irrational to forbid noncitizen suits while allow-
ing  citizen  suits  that  it has  operated  as  if  the  limitation  did  not
exist.  If, however,  all  the  eleventh  amendment  does  is  say  that
article  III  should  not be  read  affirmatively  to authorize the  suits
with  which  the  amendment  deals,  there  is  simply  no need  for  a
like  provision  for suits  by a  state's  owii  citizens,  because  there  is
no  language  in  article  III  that  could be  read  affirmatively  to  au-
thorize  those suits.  It  is  only if the result of the  eleventh  amend-
ment is to forbid, as a constitutional matter, the suits it enumerates
that  one  is  hard  pressed  to  find  a  rationale  for  so  distinguishing
between citizen and noncitizen suits.
A  common  law  view  of  sovereign  immunity  thus  fits  better
with the eleventh  amendment's wording  than  does a constitutional
view, although neither interpretation  is absolutely  trouble-free.
Since  the eleventh  amendment  passed  with so  little discussion,
it  is  not  surprising  that  the  Framers  failed  to  differentiate  be-
97 It  is  largely  irrelevant  to  the  scope  of  federal  immunity  whether  it  is  a
constitutional  or a common law requirement.  If it is common law, it can be changed
by  congressional  action.  Also,  if  it  is  constitutional,  it  can  be  changed  by  con-
gressional  action  as  long  as  the  rule  persists  that  jurisdiction  attaches  upon  the
sovereign's  consent.  (One  case  disagreed  with  the  consent  rule  as  applied  to  the
United  States,  Williams  v.  United  States,  289  U.S.  553  (1933),  but  Williams has
not  been  followed  in  that  regard.  See,  e.g.,  Glidden  v.  Zdanok,  370  U.S.  530,
562-66  (1962).  Cf. Utah v. United  States,  403  U.S.  9  (1971)  (original  action).)
Whether  federal  immunity  is  of constitutional  or common  law stature  could  make  a
difference  only  if the judiciary  were  to take  an  active  role  in  altering  common  law
immunity,  a  more  active  role  than  courts  would  take  as the  interpreters  of  consti-
tutional immunity.  Since Congress speaks  often concerning  United States  immunity,
a  highly  creative  judicial  role  in  developing  federal  common.-law  there  may  be
unlikely.
With  state  immunity,  the  question  of  constitutional  or  common  law  status  at
least  in  theory would  seem  more  significant.  Congress,  as  well  as  state  legislatures
and  judiciaries,  could  alter  a  common  law  immunity  requirement.  The  consent
exception  to  a constitutional  rule  of immunity,  however,  would  refer to  consent  on
the part of the state, not the federal  government.  My forthcoming  article  discussing
court rulings  on  congressional  power  to  abridge  states'  immunity  will  examine  how
much  difference  acceptance  of  a  constitutional  status  for  sovereign  immunity  has
made  in practice.
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tween  repudiating  Chisholm's abrogation  of  sovereign  immunity
and establishing that immunity as a constitutional requirement., The
result  of the  positions  was in many ways precisely  the same:  Chis-
holm and  its reasoning  were  overturned,  and  sovereign  immunity
prevailed.  The  difference would develop only if efforts  were made
to  modify  sovereign  immunity,  by  means  short  of  constitutional
amendment.""  If  the  desired  result  was  simply an  overturning  of
Chisholm, it is  not surprising  that  contemporaries  did not  advert
to  differences  between  sovereign  immunity  as a constitutional  and
as a common  law requirement.
A  fuller  discussion  of  the  consequences  of  thus  viewing  sov-
ereign  immunity as a common law  development will be undertaken
in the next article in this  series.  Whether it would greatly change
the law depends  upon the Court's  opinions  delineating the bounds
on  sovereign  immunity  in application,  which  I  will  discuss  there,
and  on  how  far  those  opinions  depart  from  the  practical  conse-
quences  that would result  from the common  law model.  For now,
it  suffices  to point out that viewing sovereign  immunity  as a com-
mon law doctrine would effectuate  the generally desirable  result of
leaving  immunity  as  a  question  of  policy,  to  be  determined  by
Congress  and adjusted  to  changing  notions  concerning  the  proper
role  of  the doctrine.  To some  extent  it would also  affect  courts'
leeway  in  deciding  sovereign  immunity  issues.99  Certainly  sov-
ereign  immunity could, under the common law approach,  have  the
same  contours  it has  today,  if Congress  and  the  courts  found its
current limits to be desirable.  In any  event, making  its nonconsti-
tutional  status  explicit  should  help  avoid  the  situation  described
in United States v. Lee,1 00  where  the Court said  the immunity doc-
trine  had  always  been  treated  as  established,  without  the  reasons
for  it  ever  being given.  Moreover,  most  commentators  today are
98 If  sovereign immunity  were  regarded  simply  as  an established  common  law
doctrine,  Congress  could  modify it.  The  Congress  that passed  the  eleventh  amend-
ment was  not  of a mind to do  so, however.  Also,  in an  era of freewheeling  federal
common  law,  the  federal  judiciary  might  itself  make  desired  modifications.  Un-
doubtedly  Congress  would  have  greeted  such  an  effort  with  dismay  if  it  followed
closely  upon  the  enactment  of  the  amendment.  But  this  does  not  in  itself  show
that  the  eleventh  amendment  made the  immunity. -doctrine  a  constitutional  require-
ment.  If Congress  had  considered the  issue  (as  irprobably  did not),  it might  well
have not  feared  such a step  from the judiciary, a step  that was  not presaged by the
very  different reasoning  of the  Chisholm opinions.
99 There  is  evidence  that  in  the past  immunity has  been  handled  as  a  policy
question varying with the demands  of the times.  See generally Baker, supra note  89.
100 106  U.S.  196,  207  (1882).  The  Court  was  speaking  of  both  the  states'
and the  United States'  immunity.
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sharply  critical  of  sovereign  immunity,1°1  and  its  persistence  is
often explained  by the supposed  constitutional  compulsion  behind
the doctrine.1 0 2
B.  Does the Sovereign Immunity Protection  Extend to
State Courts?
Viewing  state  immunity  as  non-constitutional  also  helps  re-
solve another  issue of eleventh amendment  interpretation-whether
the amendment's  protection  extends to state courts.  Is the eleventh
amendment of any relevance  when states are sued in state court on
federal  causes  of action? 103
A  reading  of  the  amendment  would  suggest  that  the  answer
to  this  question  is  an  obvious  negative,  since  the  amendment  is
limited  in  terms  to  a  prohibition  of a  certain  construction  of the
United States' judicial  power.  Because  the  language  claimed to  be
relevant  in article  III  similarly  describes  the extent  of the  federal
judicial  power,  any sovereign  immunity  protection  that  article  ex-
tends would seem also to reach  only federal courts.
The issue arose recently when  Mr. Justice Marshall, in his con-
curring opinion in Government Employees,' 1°  made the obvious an-
swer explicit.  Justice  Marshall  took the position that a  particular
federal statute  purported  to  lift the sovereign immunity protection
0-1  See,  e.g.,  3  K.  DAVis,  ADmn-sT  TxvE L.w  TRAISE,  551-72  (1976).
For judicial  criticism,  see,  e~g.,  National  City Bank  v. Republic  of  China,  348 U.S.
356,  359  (1955)  (Frankfurter,  J.);  Stone  v.  Arizona  Highway  Comm'n,  93  Ariz.
384,  381  P.2d  107  (1963);  Muskopf  v. Coming  Hosp.  Dist.,  55  Cal.  2d  211,  359
P.2d 457,  11  Cal.  Rptr. 89, modified sub nom.  Coming  Hosp. Dist.  v. Superior  Ct.,
57 Cal. 2d 482, 370 P.2d 325, 20 Cal.  Rptr. 620  (1961);  Hargrove v.  Cocoa  Beach,
96  So. 2d 130  (Fla.  1957).
1
02  See C.  JACOBS,  supra note  3,  at  160  ("continued  observance  [of  sovereign
immunity]  . . . should  depend  upon  whether  it  is  incorporated  into  the  Consti-
tution and  hence made  obligatory  upon  the judiciary  unless waived  by the  govern-
ment");  Comment,  Private Suits Against  States in the Federal Courts, 33  U.  Cr.
L. REv.  331,  332  (1966)  (the  major  reason  sovereign immunity  retains  any vitality
today is the  supposed  constitutional  basis  for the  doctrine).
Hart & Wechsler  ask  whether  "the  Supreme  Court  in  modem  times  has  not
tended  actually to enlarge  the scope  of sovereign  immunity, out  of misapprehension
of  its  historical  foundations,  while  at  the  same  time  professing  to  regard  it  with
disfavor  as  an  anachronism  which  should  be  narrowly  confined."  P.  BATOR,
P.  MrsmsN,  D.  Sxiumo  &  H.  WEcnvsLER,  HART  &  WcHsLER's  Tn  FE  ERAL
CourTs  im  =  FEDERAL  SYsTEm  1339  (2d  ed.  1973).  The  authors  also  made
this  statement  in  their  first  edition,  prior  to  the  Court's  decision  in  Edelman  v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651  (1974),  but that decision  is in many ways  a paradigm  example
of the  authors'  point.
o10  An  analogous  issue  is  whether  a  state,  in  its  courts,  may  subject  another
state to liability.  See Hall  v. University  of Nevada,  8  Cal. 3d  522,  503  P.2d  1363,
105  Cal.  Rptr.  355  (1972),  cert. denied, 414  U.S.  820  (1973).  But  see Western
Union  Telegraph  Co. v. Pennsylvania,  368  U.S.  71,  80  (1961)  (dictum).
104 411  U.S. at  287  (Marshall,  J.,  concurring).
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in order to allow state hospital or school employees to sue, the'states
for  overtime  pay  or for  unpaid  minimum  wages.  He  found  the
statute unconstitutional, however, on the ground that Congress lacks
power to lift a state's immunity from federal suit without  the state's
consent.'05  Nonetheless, he pointed out, his position did not render
unenforceable  congressional  statutes,  in  areas  within  Congress'  ar-
ticle  I  powers,  regulating  states'  primary  conduct. 0 6  Suits  to en-
force  such statutes can be brought in state court, for Congress may
validly lift any immunity the state has there. 07  The Court majority
said  that arguably  Congress  could  permit  suit  in  state  courts,  but
that it need not resolve  the  question.1 0
There  are  some  indications  that  prior  to  Government Em-
ployees the  assumption  was  that  Congress  could  not impose  these
suits  in  state  court.  In Parden v.  Terminal Ry., 1 0 9  for  example,
the Court seemed  to accept, without questioning  its propriety, Ala-
bama's assertion that its courts would not hear the suit in question." 0
Similarly in Hans  v. Louisiana," the Court indicated that the result
of its opinion, recognizing sovereign immunity in the federal courts
even in  citizen  suits, was  to leave  to state  legislatures  the  option
whether  to waive  immunity  or  not.  The  Court  did  not contem-
plate  imposition on the state judiciary by Congress.112
105 Id.  296-98.
106  This  area appeared much larger  at the time  of Government Employees than
it  has  since.  In  National  League  of  Cities  v.  Usery,  426  U.S.  833  (1976),  the
Court cut  back sharply  on  Congress'  ability  to  regulate  the  states,  invalidating  the
very  enactments  at  issue  in  Government Employees.  Both  Usery  and  Government
Employees are  subjects  of extensive  further discussion in the  next article.
107  Responding  to  Government  Employees,  Congress  has  since  attempted  ex-
plicitly  to  impose  the  suits  in  question  upon  state  courts.  Fair  Labor  Standards
Amendments  of  1974,  Pub.  L.  No.  93-259,  § 6,  88  Stat.  55  (amending  29  U.S.C.
§ 216(b)  (1970)).  Earlier,  Congress  opened  state  courts  to  private  damage  suits
against states under the Federal Employers'  Liability Act  § 6, 45  U.S.C.  356  (1970).
108 The argument  is  that  if we  deny  this  direct federal  court  remedy,  we
in effect  are recognizing  that there  is a  right without  any remedy.  Section
16(b),  however,  authorizes  employee  suits  in  "any  court  of  competent
jurisdiction."  Arguably,  that permits  suit in  the  Missouri  courts  but that
is a question we need not reach.  We are concerned only with the problem
of  this  Act  and  the  constitutional  constraints  on  "the  judicial  power"  of
the  United States.
411  U.S.  at 287.  In context  it  is  clear  that  the  only  ground  on  which  the  Court
considered  questioning  the  state  courts'  jurisdiction  concerned  Congress'  ability  to
impose  suits  upon  the state.
109  377 U.S.  184  (1964).
110 See 377 U.S. at 190 n.8.
111 134 U.S.  1  (1890).
112 Id.  20-21.  The  Court  also  spoke  of sovereign  immunity  as  exempting  the
state  from  suit  by  individuals  "in  a  court  of  justice,"  not  limiting  its  holding  to
actions  in federal  courts.  Id.
1978]548  UNIVERSITY  OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAW  REVIEW
The argument  that Congress  lacks  power  to impose  suit upon
the states, even in a state forum, is an argument  that the  Coustitu-
tion  confers  upon  the  states  an  affirmative  right  of  sovereign  im-
munity.11 3  That the  eleventh amendment's  Framers  adopted  lan-
guage  of limitation  of federal  judicial  power,  the  argument runs,
reflects  a  belief on  their part  that the  state judicial  power  in any
event  would  not  encompass  such  suits.  They  failed  to  mention
the  state  judicial  power  either  because  they  assumed  that  states
could not be regulated under Congress'  article I powers,  or because
they simply overlooked that Congress might adopt the expedient of
subjecting a state  to suit in its own courts.
A  state  case  adopting  this position  is  Mossman v.  Donahey."4
Like  Government Employees, it  was  a  suit  brought  against  state
officials  under  the  Fair  Labor  Standards  Act. 15  The  court  said:
If the  Eleventh  Amendment  creates  or  affirms  a  substan-
tive  state  right  of  sovereign  immunity,  as  the  [Supreme
Court]  has  often  stated,  rather  than  a  "hypertechnical"
right  for  a state  to  choose  a  state  forum,  as  Mr.  Justice
Marshall  argues,  then  that  right, to  have  any substantive
effect,  must  be  as applicable  in a  state  forum  as  in a  fed-
eral  one."6
This position leaves something  to be desired in terms  of adher-
ence  to constitutional  language.  But, as previous  discussion  shows,
that defect is shared by several  established  eleventh amendment  po-
sitions;  comporting  with  constitutional  language  has  not  proved  a
necessity  in  this area.
Another  argument  against  the  availability  of state  courts rests
on their  comparative  inappropriateness  as  fora  for  these  suits.  If
in any class  of cases  federal jurisdiction  is  to  be  preferred  because
113 There  is  language  in  Supreme  Court  opinions  that  supports  this  view.
E.g.,  Edelman  v.  Jordan,  415  U.S.  651,  673  (1974)  (immunity  as  the  state's
"constitutional  right");  Great  Northern  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Read,  322  U.S.  47,  51
(1944)  ("A  state's  freedom  from  litigation  was  established  as  a  constitutional  right
through the  Eleventh  Amendment.").  For a  critique  of  this  approach,  see  Baker,
Federalism  and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U.  COLO.  L. REv.  139,  163-65  (1977).
11446  Ohio  St. 2d  1, 16, 346  N.E.2d  305,  314  (1976).
115 29 U.S.C.  §§ 201-19  (1970).
116 46  Ohio St. 2d  at  16, 346  N.E.2d  at  314.  But see  Clover  Bottom Hosp.  &
School v. Townsend,  513  S.W.2d  505  (Tenn.  1974),  another  FLSA suit  against the
state in state  court.  There  the court  accepted  Justice  Marshall's  view  and held the
state  liable.  Similarly  the  Second  Circuit  in  Fitzpatrick  v.  Bitzer,  519  F.2d  559,
570-71  (2d  Cir.  1975),  modified  on  other  grounds, 427  U.S.  445  (1976),  said
Congress  could  impose  damage suits against  the states  in state  court,  and it implied
the  same in McAuliffe  v. Carlson,  520 F.2d 1305,  1309  (2d Cir. 1975),  cert. denied,
427  U.S.  911  (1976).
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of possible bias  in  the state judiciary,  suits  against  the state prem-
ised  upon  federal  law  would  seem  a  prime  category  for  federal
jurisdiction.117  Mr. Justice  Marshall's  position-that these suits are
viable  only  in  the  less  appropriate  fora-seems' ironic,  especially
since  the failure  to extend  to state  courts  the prohibition  he finds
on federal jurisdiction was probably an oversight.  At most, however,
this raises  a  question  of policy  for  Congress  when facing  the  issue
whether  to  utilize  state  judiciaries-a  question  whether  enforce-
ment in the  less appropriate  fora is better  than no  enforcement at
all.  Justice  Marshall  is  correct  to  conclude  that  nothing  in  the
Constitution prevents Congress, within its article I and other powers,
from thus making use of state judicial systems to resolve individuals'
disputes with states.
Justice  Marshall's  position,  obviously  supported  by  the  con-
stitutional  language,  is, then,  the sounder;  here  as well,  the literal
meaning  of  the  eleventh  amendment  should prevail,  and  the  sov-
ereign  immunity  protection  should not be construed  to  extend  to
state courts.  There is no problem in following the literal meaning
of the eleventh  amendment  in this respect if one adopts  the earlier
suggested  view  that  the amendment's  effect  is  limited  to  restoring
sovereign immunity  to the status  of an established  and permissible
common  law  doctrine.  It  was  only  in the  federal  courts  that the
propriety  of  the  doctrine  had  been  challenged-by  the  argument
that the judicial power language was intended  to forbid it.  There-
fore it  was only  in  the  federal  courts  that  the amendment needed
to have any effect.  The eleventh amendment  does not confer upon
the states a substantive right to enjoy sovereign immunity.  Instead,
common  law  controls,  together,  of  course,  with  any  supplementa-
tions  Congress  or  state  legislatures  choose  to  make.  Congress  may
impose  suit  upon  states  in  state  court,  just  as  it  may  in  federal
court  (despite Justice Marshall's views to the contrary),  because  the
sovereign immunity doctrine has no constitutional  sanction.
117 True,  cases  involving  the state  decided  adverse to private plaintiffs  claiming
a federal  right  are  appealable  to  the  Supreme  Court.  Cohens  v. Virginia,  19  U.S.
(6  Wheat.)  264  (1821).  Supreme  Court  review,  however,  is  not  an  adequate
substitute  for  original federal  jurisdiction;  when  cases  come  to  the  Supreme  Court,
factual  findings have  already  been  made,  and  the  case  generally  has  already  been
shaped  by  the  time  review  is  sought.  Osborn  v.  Bank  of  the  United  States,  22
U.S.  (9  Wheat.)  738,  822-23  (1824)  ("the  insecure  remedy  of  an  appeal,  upon
[a]  point,  after  it has  received  that  shape  which  may  be  given  to  it  by  another
tribunal").  See  generally Field,  Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The  Scope  of
the  Pullman  Abstention  Doctrine,  122  U.  PA.  L.  Rxv.  1071,  1083-84  (1974);
Mishkin,  The  Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53  COLtmm.  L.  REv.  157,
158  n.9, 171-76  (1953).
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